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THE LAW AGAINST FAMILY SEPARATION

Carrie F. Cordero, Heidi Li Feldman, Chimène I. Keitner*
ABSTRACT
This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of how
domestic and international law limits the U.S. government’s ability to
separate foreign children from the adults accompanying them when
they seek to enter the United States. As early as March 6, 2017, thenSecretary of Homeland Security John Kelly told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer
that he was considering separating families at the border as a
deterrent to illegal immigration as part of a “zero tolerance” policy
whereby the Trump administration intended the strictest
enforcement of immigration law against those migrants coming to the
U.S. southern border. Kelly did not say upon what legal basis the
administration could lawfully separate families at the border as a
component of its immigration policies. Whatever the merits of
maximal prosecution of adults unlawfully crossing the border,
adopting this policy did not convert family separation into a lawful
byproduct of the arrest of an adult. To the contrary, domestic and
international law militates strongly against the lawfulness of family
separation as a tool for immigration deterrence, yielding liability for
the state and for individuals who implement family separation in this
setting. Both litigation and Congressional action can and should play
a role in addressing the Trump administration’s use of family
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separation and ensuring that it is halted now and not used again, by
Trump or any other U.S. President.
In the Article, we start with a factual chronology of the
Trump Administration’s family separation policy. We then argue for
our positions regarding the illegality of the policy and its
implementation. In Part II, we describe the federal government’s
recognized authority to enforce immigration laws and ensure border
security, on the one hand, and the domestic constitutional framework
for protecting the basic rights of migrant parents and children, on the
other. In Part III we examine the reach of domestic law, including the
common law of torts, for dealing with wrongful family separation in
the immigration setting. Part IV reviews international law that
protects against this harm. In the Conclusion we propose a range of
steps that the U.S. Congress could take to repair at least some of the
harm caused by the family separation policy, and to ensure that no
future administration contemplates similar action.
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INTRODUCTION
In an interview on March 6, 2017, then-Secretary of
Homeland Security John Kelly told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that he was
considering separating families at the border as a deterrent to illegal
immigration.1 Multiple administration officials have since stated
publicly that the purpose of the separations was to serve as a
deterrent.2 This rationale was repeated even though evidence does
not support the idea that such policies have a deterrent effect.3
1.
The Situation Room (@CNNSitRoom), TWITTER (Mar. 6, 2017, 2:24 PM),
https://twitter.com/CNNSitRoom/status/838877868453064704
[https://perma.cc/
55GL-8C6T]. In the interview, Wolf Blitzer asked, “Are you considering a new
initiative that would separate children from their parents if they try to enter the
United States illegally?” Kelly responded, “I would do almost anything to deter
the people from Central America [from] getting on this very, very dangerous
network [that facilitates movement through Mexico to the United States]. . . . Yes,
I am considering in order to deter . . . exactly that, they will be well cared for as we
deal with their parents.” (emphasis added).
2.
See, e.g., David Shepardson, Trump Says Family Separations Deter
Illegal Immigration, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-immigration-trump/trump-says-family-separations-deter-illegal-immigrationidUSKCN1MO00C [https://perma.cc/5SHY-UMBB] (reporting that Trump
articulated the deterrence rationale); Beth Van Schaack, New Proof Surfaces That
Family Separation Was About Deterrence and Punishment, JUST SECURITY (Nov.
27, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61621/proof-surfaces-family-separationdeterrence-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/4AMR-9273] (reporting on government
documents that “reveal that the underlying intent” of the family separation policy
was “to deter additional immigration and asylum petitions”); Philip Bump, Here
Are the Administration Officials Who Have Said that Family Separation Is Meant
as a Deterrent, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/politics/wp/2018/06/19/here-are-the-administration-officials-who-have-saidthat-family-separation-is-meant-as-a-deterrent/ (on file with the Columbia
Human Rights Law Review) (noting that multiple officials, including former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Steven Wagner, Acting Assistant Secretary
for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services, stated
that the policy served as a deterrent); see also Nick Miroff, Acting Homeland
Security Chief Frustrated and Isolated—Even as He Delivers What Trump Wants
at the Border, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
immigration/acting-homeland-security-chief-frustrated-and-isolated--even-as-hedelivers-what-trump-wants-at-the-border/2019/10/01/b62e740c-e3ad-11e9-b403f738899982d2_story (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review)
(reporting that Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan, one of
the original architects of the zero tolerance prosecution policy, later determined
that the family separations “went too far”).
3.
See, e.g., Tom K. Wong, Do Family Separation and Detention Deter
Immigration?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 24, 2018), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/07/24/453660/family-separationdetention-deter-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/75HB-KWJU] (finding that both
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Nevertheless, from the very early days of the Trump
Administration, the senior official in charge of enforcing immigration
laws acknowledged that what later became known as the family
separation policy was intended to be a harsh mechanism of
enforcement—so harsh, in fact, that the administration apparently
believed and hoped it would deter future migration over the southern
border. What was left unresolved at the time was upon what legal
basis the administration could lawfully separate families at the
border—without any assurance of limited duration or promise of
reunification—as a component of its immigration and border security
policies.
This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of how
domestic and international law limits the U.S. government’s ability to
separate families when they seek to enter the United States. To be
sure, bona fide concerns about children’s safety and increased
awareness of the problem of human trafficking mean that some
children were likely also separated from accompanying adults prior to
2017. To our knowledge, however, the U.S. government’s policies and
practices beginning in 2018 represent the first time the United States
deliberately separated arriving migrant and asylum-seeking families
as a tactic for deterring migration. Moreover, it quickly became clear
that the government had no plans to reunify families, or even to track
which children in the government’s custody had originally arrived
with their parents or relatives and had been forcibly separated from
them. The conditions of confinement of these children—and their
accompanying adults—have been well publicized.4 In response to the
family separation and family detention “have been shown to be ineffective
deterrents”); Adam Cox & Ryan Goodman, Detention of Migrant Families as
“Deterrence”: Ethical Flaws and Empirical Doubts, JUST SECURITY (June 22,
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58354/detention-migrant-families-deterrenceethical-flaws-empirical-doubts/ [https://perma.cc/2LCS-W74L] (arguing that
available evidence not only fails to establish a causal link between U.S. detention
policies and border crossings, but also that “there’s not even a correlational
relationship”); Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a
Regional Refugee Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central
American Women and Children at the US-Mexico Border, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM.
SEC. 137, 139 (2017) (arguing that Obama-era policies aimed at deterrence,
including family detention, expedited removal, accelerated proceedings, and raids,
were unsuccessful in disincentivizing migration into the United States because
the true causes were “push” factors in migrants’ home countries).
4.
See, e.g., Grace Segers & Graham Kates, Watchdog Details Psychological
Trauma Among Migrant Children Separated from Families, CBS NEWS (Sept. 4,
2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hhs-inspector-general-report-detailspsychological-trauma-among-separated-migrant-children/ [http://perma.cc/84ME-
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public outcry over the separation of families, the government
announced a policy of potentially indefinite family detention that is
not consistent with the long-standing court-supervised agreement5
specifying time limits on children’s detention and basic standards of
treatment for immigrant children and families.6 In September 2019, a
judge enjoined that new policy of indefinite family detention.7 As this
ZLQS] (providing information on reports issued by the Office of Inspector General
and Department of Health and Human Services on the psychological effects of
family separation on children); Camilo Montoya-Galvez, New Pictures Show
“Dangerous Overcrowding” at Border Patrol Facilities in Texas, CBS NEWS (July
2, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dhs-inspector-general-report-revealssqualid-conditions-at-migrant-detention-centers/
[https://perma.cc/QQT7-7J3W]
(documenting conditions at detention centers); Lizzie O’Leary, “Children Were
Dirty, They Were Scared, and They Were Hungry,” An Immigration Attorney
Describes What She Witnessed at the Border, ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/06/child-detention-centersimmigration-attorney-interview/592540/ (on file with the Columbia Human
Rights Law Review) (same).
5.
See Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2017). The Flores
Settlement Agreement was reached in 1997 (and subsequently modified) as a
result of advocacy litigation challenging the duration and conditions of
government detention of migrant minors. The settlement over time has provided
that children may only be detained for twenty days; after that, the government
must release them to family members or other suitable care, such as a licensed
facility. The Trump Administration has encouraged Congress to act to relieve the
government of the requirements placed on it by the Flores settlement.
Simultaneously, it has sought court relief from the agreement’s requirements. The
government argues it should be able to detain families in immigration processing
indefinitely pending the adjudication of their immigration proceedings. See SARAH
HERMAN PECK & BEN HARRINGTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45297, THE
“FLORES SETTLEMENT” AND ALIEN FAMILIES APPREHENDED AT THE U.S. BORDER:
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R45297.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3CD-5L3J]. In August 2019, (former) Acting
Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan and Secretary of Health and
Human Services Alex Azar announced new proposed regulations in response to
the Flores settlement that would enable the government to hold children and
families for longer than 20 days. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Security, DHS and HHS Announce New Rule to Implement the Flores Settlement
Agreement; Final Rule Published to Fulfill Obligations Under Flores Settlement
Agreement (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/08/21/dhs-and-hhsannounce-new-rule-implement-flores-settlement-agreement
[https://perma.cc/Y3C7-TCVB].
6.
See Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Migrant Families Would
Face Indefinite Detention Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/flores-migrant-family-detention.
html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
7.
See Miriam Jordan, Judge Blocks Trump Administration Plan to Detain
Migrant Children, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/
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article went to press, the case is pending before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A coalition of Attorneys General from
nineteen states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief
urging the Court to uphold the injunction.8
Comprehensively assessing the law against family separation
is a complex undertaking. The underlying practice—deliberate,
harsh, and large-scale family separation as a deterrent to migration
or intended lawful immigration—is unparalleled in U.S. history, so it
is not necessarily obvious which bodies of law apply, and how. As it
turns out, many types of law prohibit this practice, though some could
use bolstering by congressional action. The Article, therefore, is a
broad survey of applicable areas of law with concrete discussion of
how to use them. We look at an expansive range of currently
applicable law, consider the viability of different specific legal
approaches, and make an initial effort to identify the kind of federal
legislation that could address the Trump Administration’s family
separation policies and practice beyond the important and
consequential litigation that has already been brought.
We begin with what happened. Part I of this Article provides
a summary of the Trump Administration’s implementation of family
separation, and early legal challenges to that activity. Our legal
analysis begins with Part II, which describes the federal
government’s authority to enforce immigration laws and ensure
border security, on the one hand, and the constitutional framework
for protecting the basic rights of migrant parents and children, on the
other.9 Part III addresses the reach of domestic civil law for dealing
27/us/migrant-children-flores-court.html (on file with the Columbia Human
Rights Law Review).
8.
For more information on the status of the Flores injunction, see Vermont
Joins Fight to Maintain Rights of Children in Detention, VT. BUS. MAG. (Jan. 29,
2020),
https://vermontbiz.com/news/2020/january/29/vermont-joins-fightmaintain-rights-children-immigration-detention [https://perma.cc/F4KK-Q3WN].
9.
In this Article, we use the term “migrant” to describe individuals who
enter the United States by crossing an international border. This category
includes asylum-seekers who are entitled to additional protections under both
domestic and international law, as described below. It does not include refugees
whose applications are processed overseas, and who are subsequently admitted to,
and resettled in, the United States. It is not possible to determine whether a given
migrant who has crossed the border is an asylum-seeker without an
individualized assessment, nor is it possible to determine without an
individualized assessment whether an asylum-seeker is, in fact, legally entitled to
receive asylum. The question of whether other categories of migrants, such as
those fleeing natural disasters or the collapse of the rule of law, should also be
accorded special legal protection lies outside the scope of this Article. Other
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with wrongful family separation in the context of immigration
enforcement. Part IV assesses the international legal framework
governing the United States’ treatment of migrant children and
families. Our analysis shows that a policy or practice of separating
families at the border as an immigration deterrent is an
impermissible infringement on due process rights, is open to
challenge under several theories of civil liability, and is inconsistent
with principles of international law. While the federal government
unquestionably is authorized to regulate immigration and enforce
border security, that enforcement must be exercised consistent with
fundamental constitutional principles of due process and family
integrity, as well as an over-arching anti-dehumanization principle.
This Article explains that the U.S. government may not
indiscriminately remove children from their parents, or parents from
their children, for a potentially indeterminate period of time as a
deliberate deterrent to immigration. The Article concludes that
violations of these basic constitutional rights can and should be
afforded remedies in the form of civil relief, and that Congress should
take legislative action to remedy past harm and to prevent future
abuses.

I. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY TO
SEPARATE FAMILIES AT THE SOUTHERN BORDER TO DETER
MIGRATION
The family separation policy was not an aberration; it was the
culmination of processes set in motion during the 2016 campaign and
soon after the new administration took office. A central feature of the
2016 Trump presidential campaign was its emphasis on limiting
immigration and stopping the flow of Central American migrants into
the United States via the southern border with Mexico.10 Within days
of assuming office, President Trump took executive action to limit
immigration. On January 25, 2017, he signed Executive Order 13767,
which, among other things, directed the immediate commencement of
immigration-related measures, such as the “Remain in Mexico” program, the
attempt to allow “expedited removal” nationwide, and the drastic reduction in
refugee admissions also lie beyond this Article’s scope.
10.
See Nick Corasaniti, A Look at Trump’s Immigration Plan, Then and
Now, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/
31/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration-changes.html (on file with the Columbia
Human Rights Law Review); Don Gonyea, Trump’s Plan to ‘Make Mexico Pay’ for
the Wall, NPR (April 5, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/05/473109475/trumpsplan-to-make-mexico-pay-for-the-wall [https://perma.cc/7QFN-S2EU].
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(i) constructing a wall on the southern border, (ii) expediting
immigration processing, and (iii) taking other steps to increase border
security and immigration law enforcement.11 That same day, the
president issued Executive Order 13768, which, among other things,
directed full enforcement of immigration laws and the withholding of
federal funds from so-called sanctuary cities.12 To implement the
president’s orders, on February 20, 2017, the Secretary of Homeland
Security sent an implementation memorandum to senior Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, including the Acting General
Counsel and the acting officials in charge of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The memo
provided that, among other things, the “Department would no longer
exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential
enforcement,” would hire thousands more agents and officers, and
would no longer afford privacy law protections to those who were not
either U.S. citizens or lawful residents.13
Over the course of the next year, the Trump Administration
struggled to implement its intended immigration and border security
policies, in part due to the haste with which the policies were
executed. The policies were not subject to typical interagency
coordination among the various parts of the Executive Branch,
including relevant stakeholders such as the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of State. In
part because of this lack of internal process and interagency
consultation, legal challenges to the original “travel ban” executive
order succeeded in forcing the Administration to scale back some of
its original intended activities.14 By the spring of 2018, however, the

11.
Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-border-securityimmigration-enforcement-improvements/ [https://perma.cc/LH6U-NEZV].
12.
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-enhancing-public-safetyinterior-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/D7LP-EGRX].
13.
Memorandum from Secretary John Kelly to Senior Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Officials (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-toServe-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UWR-H5DP].
14.
See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protectingnation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states-2/; Carrie Cordero & Quinta Jurecic,
From the Travel Ban to Family Separations: Malevolence, Incompetence,
Carelessness, LAWFARE (July 3, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/travel-ban-
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Administration had developed a new approach to effectuate its
immigration policy objectives. On April 6, 2018, President Trump
directed the end of a practice derogatively referred to as “catch and
release,” which permitted border authorities to release apprehended
aliens suspected of being unlawfully present in the United States and
to allow them to remain within U.S. territory during the adjudication
of their immigration status, which could take many months or even
years.15 That same day, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a
policy of “zero tolerance” or “100 percent prosecution,” meaning that
every instance of unauthorized entry or attempted unauthorized
entry into the U.S. would be prosecuted by the DOJ.16 This approach
abandoned the longstanding U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) policy
and practice to focus prosecutorial resources on cases of defendants
who were unlawfully present in the United States and had been
convicted of a serious crime or posed a legitimate public safety
concern.
This new prosecutorial guideline was a substantial departure
from traditional DOJ practice.17 The Attorney General directed
family-separations-malevolence-incompetence-carelessness
[https://perma.cc/
X8ML-UQ4M].
15.
Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
the Attorney General on ending “Catch and Release” at the Border, WHITE HOUSE
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialmemorandum-secretary-state-secretary-defense-attorney-general-secretaryhealth-human-services-secretary-homeland-security/
[https://perma.cc/X86ZQRVU].
16.
Memorandum for Federal Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1049751/download [https://perma.cc/4BDZ-LXM2]; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Zero Tolerance Policy for Criminal
Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-generalannounces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry
[https://perma.cc/PMY38M83]. The government’s position has been that those entering at ports of entry
seeking lawful entry would not be prosecuted. But, at the same time, the
government implemented a metering practice that limited the ability of migrants
to seek lawful entry. See Stephanie Leutert, What ‘Metering’ Really Looks Like in
South Texas, LAWFARE (July 17, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whatmetering-really-looks-south-texas [https://perma.cc/7VPY-K75U].
17.
See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1042–43 (1984) (“[I]t must
be acknowledged that only a small percentage of arrests of aliens are intended or
expected to lead to criminal prosecutions.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Justice Department Smashes Records for Violent Crime, Gun Crime,
Illegal Immigration Prosecutions, Increases Drug and White Collar Prosecutions
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-smashesrecords-violent-crime-gun-crime-illegal-immigration-prosecutions [https://perma.

442

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[51.2

border region U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to “adopt a policy to prosecute
all Department of Homeland Security referrals” of attempted illegal
entry and illegal entry, “to the extent practicable.”18 Once adult aliens
were referred by DHS to DOJ for prosecution and placed into adult
facilities, they could no longer be detained along with children.19
Accordingly, government agents reclassified those children who had
arrived with an adult now subject to prosecution as unaccompanied
minors, even though they had not, in reality, entered the U.S.
unaccompanied. Once classified as “unaccompanied,” the children, in
accordance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act,20 were taken into government custody, resulting in their
potentially indefinite detention: first with CBP, and then, according
to law and protocols, under the supervision of HHS. Meanwhile, DHS
publicly denied that it had a family separation policy, stating in a
press release that “DHS does not have a blanket policy of separating
families at the border.”21 Yet, the same DHS press release, entitled
cc/UW8E-2S2D] (citing a 38% increase in illegal entry prosecutions in 2018). For
an example of earlier DOJ prosecution guidelines in one U.S. Attorney’s Office,
see Data Source: United States Courts, WALL STREET J., http://wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/DAG2106-2166.pdf [https://perma.cc/54NY-Q3VX].
18.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces ZeroTolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry
[https://perma.cc/MC3B-3WPX].
19.
See Family Separation and Detention, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.
americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/immig
ration/familyseparation/ [https://perma.cc/SU25-RXVZ] (“Since children cannot be
held in criminal detention, the children are designated as ‘unaccompanied alien
children’ and placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human
Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). ORR places the children in
shelters until they are released.”); Why Are Families Being Separated at the
Border?, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 13, 2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/
blog/why-are-families-being-separated-at-the-border-an-explainer/ (“When adults
are detained and prosecuted in the criminal justice system for immigration
offenses, their children cannot, by law, be housed with them in criminal jails, so
the family unit is separated.”)
20.
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
21.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Myth vs. Fact: DHS
Zero Tolerance Policy (June 18, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/18/
myth-vs-fact-dhs-zero-tolerance-policy
[https://perma.cc/VCL8-AKW5].
In
addition, Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen tweeted, “We do not have a policy of
separating families at the border. Period.” DHS Sec. Kirstjen Nielsen Denies
Family Separation Policy Exists, Blames Media, CBS NEWS (June 18, 2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dhs-sec-kirstjen-nielsen-denies-family-separationpolicy-exists-blames-media/ [https://perma.cc/U7PH-DYFK].
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“Myths vs. Facts,” acknowledged the consequences of the zero
tolerance policy: once charged, an alien adult will be transferred to
the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, and “children will be
classified as an unaccompanied child and transferred to” HHS
custody.22 Thus, the new government policy intentionally created a
bureaucratic fiction, as many children classified as unaccompanied
had, in fact, entered the U.S. with a parent or family member.
Despite DHS’s effort to justify the practice, the President
issued Executive Order 13841, which purported to end the family
separation policy that DHS leadership said did not exist.23 The order
directed the Secretary of DHS to “maintain custody of alien families
during the pendency of any criminal improper entry or immigration
proceedings” unless joint detention presented a risk to the child.24 The
next day, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion requesting
modification of the Flores25 settlement which, as described further
below, has been pivotal for protecting migrant families and children
from prolonged detention.
As a result of the above chain of events, litigation and press
reports indicate that the Trump Administration has likely separated
over 2,500 children from their families at the border as part of the
enhanced enforcement effort mandated by the zero tolerance policy.26
The number of children separated from the beginning of the
administration through August 2019 appears to be at least 4,000, and
may be higher.27 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued
22.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 21.
23.
Exec. Order No. 13841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29435 (June 20, 2018).
24.
Id.
25.
Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017).
26.
In addition, the Ms. L. litigation (discussed infra note 27) has revealed
that family separations took place even before the zero tolerance policy
announcement in April 2018 as a sort of pilot program. As a result, the numbers
of children actually separated has continued to grow over time. See Family
Separation by the Numbers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrantsrights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/family-separation
[https://perma.cc/
2UDK-XRUM].
27.
The Ms. L. agreement reveals that there were an original 2,737
separated children. See infra note 28. The New York Times reported an additional
700 children separated. See Miriam Jordan, Family Separation May Have Hit
Thousands More Migrant Children than Reported, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/family-separation-trump-administrationmigrants.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). However,
the government’s lack of accurate record keeping has resulted in reports of
possible thousands of additional unknown separated children. See Miriam Jordan,
No More Family Separations, Except These 900, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019),
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the government in the Southern District of California to end the
practice of family separation and, on June 26, 2018, a federal district
court judge ordered families reunited, a process that has been
ongoing for over a year, despite continued court supervision.28 As
Judge Dana M. Sabraw stated in his order granting the preliminary
injunction:
[T]here is no genuine dispute that the government
was not prepared to accommodate the mass influx of
separated children. Measures were not in place to
provide for communication between governmental
agencies responsible for detaining parents and those
responsible for housing children, or to provide for
ready communication between separated parents and
children. There was no reunification plan in place and
families have been separated for months.29
Throughout 2018, ongoing litigation highlighted the
continued detention of migrant children, and the lack of processes in
place to promptly reunite them with family members. Reports
continued to indicate that family separation was taking place and
reunification efforts were not keeping pace with judicial orders.30 By
the summer of 2019, public attention had shifted from concerns about
the fact of detention to outrage at the conditions under which migrant
children were being detained in some facilities. Reports that children
were being detained in U.S. government custody without adequate
access to humanitarian items such as food, blankets, and
toothbrushes, resulted in renewed attention from some members of
Congress, press reports, and congressional hearings.31 In July 2019,

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/us/migrant-family-separations.html (on file
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (reporting 900 further separations
since Judge Sabraw’s injunction). We expect these statistics may continue to shift
as more information is revealed through continued litigation and press reporting.
28.
See Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133
(S.D. Cal. 2018) (order granting plaintiffs’ motion for classwide preliminary
injunction).
29.
Id at 1136–37.
30.
CNN Newsroom (@CNNNewsroom), TWITTER (Aug. 22, 2019, 8:43 AM),
https://twitter.com/CNNnewsroom/status/1164563704781967360 [https://perma.
cc/P3M8-CNQB] (“Family separations are ‘still going on,’ says ACLU lawyer Lee
Gelernt, adding that he is going back to the San Diego court on September 13,
with the hope that the judge ‘will put a halt to it.’”).
31.
Caitlin Dickerson, ‘There Is a Stench:’ Soiled Clothes and No Baths for
Migrant Children at a Texas Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html (on file with the
Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
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after media reports exposed inadequate conditions, a federal facility
in Clint, Texas was emptied of the resident children only to have
dozens more relocated back to the facility within days.32 Meanwhile,
the government has never provided a sound legal rationale for
creating and implementing a blanket policy of separating families
seeking entry into the United States as a deterrent mechanism to
discourage migration and enforce border security. The next section
provides context for the government’s exercise of its immigration and
border functions, and identifies certain constitutional limitations on
the conduct of those enforcement efforts.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A discussion of limits on the federal government’s ability to
design and carry out immigration and border security measures first
needs to take stock of its affirmative authority in these specific areas.
As discussed below, the federal government is on solid footing when it
claims significant powers, but this does not mean that it can exercise
those powers free from legal boundaries.

A. U.S. Government Authority to Regulate Immigration and
Protect the Border
Intense policy debates over immigration and border
enforcement are not new in U.S. history. Societal, political and legal
questions surrounding the arrival of migrant laborers and
immigrants of various ethnic backgrounds have been around nearly
as long as the United States itself. The U.S. has a long history of
periodically welcoming migrant laborers, followed by periods of
increased deportations and attempts to limit both legal and illegal
immigration.33 The early to mid-19th century witnessed reactions

32.
See Simon Romero et al., Hungry, Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant
Detention Center at Clint, TX, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/06/us/migrants-border-patrol-clint.html (on file
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); see also Arturo Rubio & Caitlin
Dickerson, We’re in a Dark Place: Children Returned to Troubled Texas Border
Facility, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/
john-sanders-cbp.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review)
(reporting on transfer of children from Clint, Texas).
33.
For example, the Deportation Act of 1929 resulted in the repatriation of
approximately 100,000 Mexicans back to Mexico. When farm labor was in greater
need during WWII, a new agreement was reached between the United States and
Mexico to permit increased migration for work purposes. Once the war was over
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against immigrating Irish and German laborers.34 In the mid- to late
19th century, immigration enforcement was focused on the influx of
Chinese laborers, resulting in the extreme measures of the Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882 and the Geary Act of 1892, laws motivated by
racial and ethnic prejudice.35 Early 20th century border security
efforts focused on unauthorized entry from both the Mexican and
Canadian borders.36
The authority of the federal government to regulate
immigration and enforce border security is rooted in the Constitution.
Congress’ authority to pass immigration laws comes from Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, which confers on Congress the
responsibility to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. Article II
provides the executive with the authority to enforce the law and
provide for the national security as commander in chief. Congress
explicitly granted the executive branch specific authority to control
immigration and border security in the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), the comprehensive federal law governing immigration
authorities, agencies, processes and procedures.37 Immigration law
provides a framework and process for detention and removal of aliens
who are not lawfully present on U.S. territory.38 Federal agents
responsible for enforcing the immigration laws are authorized to stop,
interrogate, arrest, and pursue proceedings against aliens who are
known to be, or suspected of being, unlawfully present.39 Absent
certain exceptions, aliens who have entered the U.S. without legal
permission can be removed after appropriate proceedings.40 Unlawful

and the need for Mexican labor decreased, a new wave of deportation enforcement
took place in the early 1950s, resulting in the apprehension of a million Mexicans
and the deportation of tens of thousands. See JAMES R. PHELPS ET AL., BORDER
SECURITY 91–94 (2d ed. 2018).
34.
Ron Elving, With Latest Nativist Rhetoric, Trump Takes America Back
to Where It Came From, NPR (July 16, 2019), https://www.npr.org/
2019/07/16/742000247/with-latest-nativist-rhetoric-trump-takes-america-back-towhere-it-came-from [https://perma.cc/VX4K-FNDK].
35.
See PHELPS ET AL., supra note 33, at 72.
36.
See id. at 68.
37.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107 (2018).
38.
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2018) (detention and removal of aliens ordered
removed).
39.
8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2018) (powers of immigration officers and employees),
8 C.F.R. § 287 (2002) (exercise of power by immigration officers).
40.
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2018) (deportable aliens).
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presence is a civil, not criminal offense,41 while improper entry is
treated as a crime that can result in a fine or up to six months’
imprisonment for a first offense.42 There are criminal penalties for reentering illegally, or re-entering following conviction of a crime.43
The federal government has an extensive structure designed
to administer and enforce its immigration and border security laws.
Historically, agencies that were involved in immigration and border
enforcement were spread across the executive branch. The Border
Patrol was created in 1924 as part of the Labor Department, due to
the close nexus between illegal immigration and migrant labor.44 At
the turn of the twentieth century, an early version of an immigration
office was located in the Treasury Department; that later became the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), re-located to the
Department of Justice in 1940. Since 2003, immigration and border
enforcement has been the responsibility of DHS. The former
INS—which used to report to the Attorney General—was dismantled.
It was relocated by an act of Congress to DHS and split into three
entities: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (including the
Border Patrol45 and the Office of Field Operations focused on ports of
entry), U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) (handling
civil immigration processing) and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) (responsible for investigations, detention, removal
and enforcement).46
The Supreme Court has recognized that competing societal
interests and individual rights must be taken into account when
enforcing immigration laws as part of border security.47 In addition to
41.
8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018) (inadmissible aliens); see also Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2018) (holding that it is not a crime for a removable
alien to remain in the U.S.)
42.
8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2018).
43.
8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2018).
44.
See PHELPS ET AL., supra note 33, at 68–69.
45.
See id. at 68. Border Patrol has grown from over 4,000 agents in 1993 to
over 23,000 agents in 2018. CBP, which includes Border Patrol, is currently the
largest federal law enforcement agency in the country. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, THE COST OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER SECURITY 3
(2019)
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
the_cost_of_immigration_enforcement_and_border_security.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8SC9-R98F].
46.
See PHELPS ET AL., supra note 33, at 88–94. ICE currently has
approximately 20,000 agents, of which 6,700 are assigned to Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI). Id.
47.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (noting
there are “limits on search and seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and
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federal statutes providing agencies and officers with specific border
enforcement authorities, current Fourth Amendment doctrine
illuminates the wide discretion that has been granted to the federal
government to enforce border security. For example, in certain
circumstances, federal government agents may conduct warrantless
searches in the context of border protection—they must only be a
reasonable distance from the border for this border search exception
to the warrant requirement to apply.48 The Court also allows border
patrol checkpoints in the interior of the United States, subject to
certain limits.49 Despite the extensive permissible enforcement
regime, however, there are constitutional limits to what the
government can do in the name of immigration enforcement. For
example, ethnic appearance alone is insufficient grounds for border
agents to stop a vehicle and question the occupants about their
immigration status, even when the vehicle is near the physical
border.50 In a significant case, the Supreme Court evaluated whether
the government’s border security justification for stopping and
questioning drivers of apparent Mexican ancestry or ethnicity
outweighed those individuals’ liberty rights, and the rights of lawful
citizens to not be stopped without more substantial justification. The
Court found that it did not.51 Thus, even in an acknowledged area of
substantial executive authority—border security—the executive’s
authority is not unbounded.
Courts have made it clear that federal authority significantly
outweighs state authority in enforcing immigration law.52 During the
twentieth century, the federal government’s primacy in immigration
went relatively unchallenged.53 In the first part of the twenty-first
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal
security of individuals.”).
48.
See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 281 (1973).
49.
Id. at 295.
50.
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1968)
(weighing the valid public interest in enforcing immigration laws against rights of
individual liberty).
51.
Id. (weighing concerns with liberty rights, including rights of citizens to
transit without unreasonable traffic delays).
52.
See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freedman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (indicating
that “[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of
foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States”).
53.
Although uncommon at the time, California passed an immigrationrelated law in 1971 providing for civil penalties for employing illegal aliens if the
employment would adversely affect “lawful resident workers.” Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 493 (2012) (California’s law withstood a preemption
challenge, but that was prior to increased federal legislation on the issue).
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century, however, states and localities have attempted to insert
themselves into immigration enforcement.54 On one end of the
spectrum, certain cities have passed “sanctuary city” laws, intended
to protect foreigners residing in the United States without legal
status.55 On the other end of the political spectrum, state
governments have sought to assert a role for themselves in clamping
down on illegal immigration. Arizona was the first state to pass
federal-like immigration legislation during this time period.56 Others
have included Indiana, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina.57 The
Supreme Court considered whether Arizona’s attempts to enforce its
own immigration laws were permissible, and found that three of four
provisions were an improper encroachment on the federal
government’s primacy in making and enforcing immigration law.58 In
2011, South Carolina’s legislature passed, and then-Governor Nikki
Haley signed into law several measures intended to address
immigration issues.59 These measures included criminal laws,
employment laws, and mandates to law enforcement to report
individuals suspected of being in the United States illegally.60 In
some states, the law mirrored or closely tracked federal immigration
law.61 State legislators recognized they were treading close to, if not

54.
United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 906 (D.S.C.
2011).
55.
See Darla Cameron, How Sanctuary Cities Work, and How Trump’s
Blocked Executive Order Could Have Affected Them, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/sanctuary-cities/ (on file with
the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
56.
Id. at 906.
57.
Id. at 906–07.
58.
See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395, 402, 406, 409; see also id. at 394 (“[T]he
Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of
immigration and the status of aliens.”). The court assumed that the federal
government would develop and execute its immigration law authority responsibly.
See id. at 414 (“The National Government has significant power to regulate
immigration. With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of national
power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its responsibility to base
its laws on a political will informed by searching, thoughtful, rational civic
discourse.”).
59.
S. 20, 2011 Leg., 119th Sess. 2011 S.C. Acts 69 (preemption of local
ordinances regarding immigration).
60.
Robbie Brown, Parts of Immigration Law Blocked in South Carolina,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/us/judge-blocksparts-of-south-carolinas-immigration-law.html (on file with the Columbia Human
Rights Law Review).
61.
United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905 (D.S.C.
2011).
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over, the line of the federal government’s authority.62 The federal
government (in addition to advocacy groups) challenged these
measures, and a district court held, with respect to the specific
sections of the South Carolina law being challenged, that federal
immigration law preempts state attempts to regulate immigration.63
The Eleventh Circuit similarly disallowed much of the immigration
enforcement provisions attempted by the state of Alabama.64 In some
cases, the courts gave states more time to determine how the state
laws would be implemented before enjoining the enforcement efforts
altogether. Given established precedent recognizing the federal
government’s primacy in developing and enforcing immigration laws,
this Article does not challenge the federal government’s authority to
enforce immigration and border security laws. Rather, it identifies
limits on what the government can do while enforcing those laws,
particularly when it comes to infringing on the rights of migrant
children and families, as discussed further below.

B. Potential Limits on the Use of Pretextual National Security
Justifications for Family Separation and Detention
In carrying out what are legitimate immigration and border
security enforcement authorities, the Administration has claimed
that its recent, more severe, activities are justified on national
security grounds. The Executive has a constitutional responsibility to
protect national security, and certain inherent powers to implement
that responsibility. Courts often defer to the executive branch when it
asserts national security justifications for laws and policies. If the
executive branch begins to abuse that deference, however, courts may
begin to look behind the proffered justifications for executive branch
activities. Such review may have long-term consequences for the
executive’s ability to act with flexibility in a true national security
emergency.
In one recent immigration-related policy decision, the
Supreme Court addressed whether the President could unilaterally

62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 922–24 (“The simple principle that the Constitution vests the
national government with certain fundamental indicia of national sovereignty,
including the control of foreign policy and foreign affairs and the administration of
immigration, has long been beyond dispute in our constitutional jurisprudence.”).
64.
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012).

2020]

The Law Against Family Separation

451

limit immigration from certain (primarily Muslim) countries.65 The
Court considered the President’s proclamation limiting entry from
certain countries identified through an interagency process as posing
threats to national security.66 The Court found that issuing the
proclamation was within the authority granted to the president by
Section 212(f) of the INA.67 Regulating immigration, the Court
observed, resides in the “core of executive responsibility.”68 The Court
acknowledged that the judiciary must be restrained when examining
motivations behind executive national security actions, while opening
the door to doing so. However, under the particular circumstances, it
was persuaded that the proclamation was based on “legitimate
national security interests.”69 In a 2019 case not involving national
security but concerning an administrative determination by the
executive branch involving the administration of the census, the
Court looked behind the agency head’s stated reason for
implementing a new regulation. Historically, the Court would not
have considered the agency head’s motivation in such a core
administrative function, but, in this case, the facts indicated that the
Commerce Secretary had given pretextual reasons for adding a
question to the census.70 The Court’s willingness to look behind the
administrative decision may portend judicial review of the reasoning
behind government policies in other contexts, such as national
security.
More specifically, future judicial consideration of executive
branch assertions of national security justifications for large-scale
detentions or detentions with open-ended time frames should take
into account historical reasons to proceed cautiously. In 2018, the
Supreme Court took the opportunity in Trump v. Hawaii to make

65.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018) (reviewing whether the
president had authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to issue a
proclamation limiting entry from certain countries, and whether the proclamation
violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution).
66.
Proclamation No. 9645, Fed. Reg. 37,635 (Sept. 24, 2017) (the
proclamation focused on countries the administration claimed “remain deficient at
this time with respect to their identity-management and information-sharing
capabilities, protocols, and practices.”).
67.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2415.
68.
Id. at 2418.
69.
Id. at 2422.
70.
Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019)
(“Altogether, the evidence tells a story that does not match the explanation the
Secretary gave for his decision.”).
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clear that Korematsu71—the 1944 case upholding Japanese-American
internment during WWII—has no place in the law.72 Separately, in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a national security case involving the detention
of an enemy combatant following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Court
held that a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant had a right
to contest the basis of his detention.73 The circumstances of current
family separation and children’s detention are obviously different
from the facts in Hamdi,74 but there are lessons to be drawn from
that case as it relates to detention. In Hamdi, the Court warned of an
“unchecked system of detention,”75 cautioning that “[i]t is during our
most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s
commitment to due process is most severely tested . . . .”76
Nevertheless, the Court in Hamdi understood Congress’s
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to authorize
detaining enemy combatants. In the family separation context, in
contrast, there is no explicit legislative authorization to separate
children from their families as a routine matter in order to deter
others from crossing the border. And, even though AUMF
affirmatively authorized the detention at issue in Hamdi, the Court
nonetheless rejected circumstances that might become “indefinite”
detention.77
Although there may be individualized circumstances
pertaining to specific persons, as a group, migrants arriving from
Central America are not a recognized severe national security threat

71.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
72.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (“Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent
may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible
relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential
authority.”).
73.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
74.
It must be noted that Hamdi’s facts differ from our circumstances. In
Hamdi, the petitioner was a U.S. citizen. However, in the circumstances we
review in this Article, the detained individuals are non-U.S. citizens without
lawful status in the United States. Further, in Hamdi, the petitioner had been
designated through an administrative process as an enemy combatant. In our
circumstances, although some detained children were actually unaccompanied,
thousands have been separated from their families because the government
initiated criminal prosecution proceedings as a result of its zero tolerance policy,
without any individualized determination.
75.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530.
76.
Id. at 532.
77.
Id. at 519–20.
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or otherwise urgent public safety threat.78 The government cannot
legitimately invoke these concerns as a legal basis for the family
separation policy. This Administration risks undermining the
executive’s prerogatives in the national security context by using
pretextual national security justifications for policies that are
actually based on political, not national security, imperatives.

C. Constitutional Rights of Families
Although family law issues might seem far removed from law
governing detention, the family separation policy implicates both.
Prior to recent litigation over family separation, family law’s
development over several decades has at times emphasized the rights
of parents, and at other times focused more heavily on the rights of
children. In Judge Sabraw’s opinion preliminarily enjoining the
family separation policy, he focused on the rights of families.79 As
described in Part III, infra, the case of Ms. L. focuses on family
members’ Fifth Amendment rights to family integrity as part of the
guarantee of liberty.
In modern U.S. legal history, parental rights have been more
strongly developed than children’s rights; but in considering family
separation as a punitive instrument of immigration policy and
enforcement, the liberty rights of the child are also compelling. First,
78.
Neither the 2018 nor the 2019 Worldwide Threat Briefing presented by
the Director of National Intelligence to Congress identified Central American
migration as one of the country’s most pressing national security threats. See
Statement of Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
4SGC-ZCJJ] (discussing Central American migration as a trend but not
identifying it as a pressing national security threat to the U.S.); Statement of
Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
(Jan. 29, 2019) , https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR--SSCI.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XL3-JTAJ] (discussing Central American migration
as a continued challenge to U.S. interests but not identifying it as a pressing
national security threat to the U.S.). In addition, independent studies regarding
public safety threats of immigrants question the existence of a correlation
between undocumented immigrants and increased crime. Anna Flagg, Is There a
Connection Between Undocumented Immigrants and Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/upshot/illegal-immigration-crimerates-research.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
79.
Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149,
1162 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (citing the “liberty interest” of parents’ rights to “care,
custody and control” of their children); see also Troxel v. Granville, infra note 81
(same).
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we consider the question of whether parents have a right not to have
their children taken away by the government.80 A government and
society that values the role of parents in guiding the development of
their children cannot adhere to that value while disrupting or even
severing the caregiving relationship between migrant parent and
child. As Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority in Troxel v.
Granville, “the liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 81
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the “care,
custody, and management of their child.”82 It is generally at the state
and local level that a child may be taken from a parent’s custody—for
example, as a result of a parent charged with a crime and detained as
a result of the charge; as a result of criminal conviction; and, in the
civil context, as a result of a custody determination in the instance of
abuse or other family law proceeding resulting in the loss of custody
of a child. The state has a responsibility to step in when parents are
unfit or unable to care for a child.83 The legal system distinguishes
between the loss of custody of a child and loss of parental rights.
Parental rights are not absolute, but the state must meet a high
standard—such as evidence of abuse or neglect—to terminate
parental rights and step in as parens patriae.84
Former Trump Administration Secretary of Homeland
Security Kirstjen Nielsen argued that the practice of family
80.
But see Jeffrey Shulman, Does the Constitution Protect a Fundamental
Right to Parent?, CONSTITUTION DAILY (July 8, 2014), https://constitution
center.org/blog/does-the-constitution-protect-a-fundamental-right-to-parent
[https://perma.cc/39MT-8NBF] (“[N]o Supreme Court case has held that the right
of parents to make . . . choices [for a child] is a fundamental one.”).
81.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (affirming the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision that the federal constitution “permits a state to
interfere with the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or
potential harm to a child.”); see also Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional
Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2011) (“Since the early 1920s, parents have
enjoyed broad constitutional rights to the care and custody of their children.”).
82.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
83.
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (concerning the pretrial
detention of a juvenile accused of serious crimes).
84.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748 (1982) (setting a high standard of “clear and
convincing evidence” before a state can sever parental rights). Moreover, the
government does not have unlimited power to step in and make decisions for a
child instead of a parent. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44 (1967) (“‘[T]he admonition
to function in a “parental relationship” is not an invitation to procedural
arbitrariness.’”) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966)).
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separation was consistent with the situation when a parent or
guardian is arrested or convicted and detained in the criminal justice
system.85 The situations are not, however, analogous. Individuals
arrested or convicted have been provided due process, either through
an arrest warrant based on probable cause issued by a judge, or a
judgment by a judge or jury. Moreover, the children of detained or
convicted adults who are subject to the criminal justice system are
not denied their own liberty, whether present or anticipatory, as long
as another caregiver is available.86 In the circumstance of family
separation, prosecution automatically resulted in government custody
of children because migrant children were separated from
accompanying adults in a foreign country, often without adequate
identifying information, making placement with an alternative family
caregiver difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the government did
not take adequate steps to facilitate reunification of separated
children and families once the parent’s improper entry violation was
processed.
There are also strong arguments that the child’s liberty rights
are infringed by the practice of family separation.87 For over eighty
years, the Supreme Court has recognized that all persons, including
those who are “young, ignorant, illiterate, [and/or] surrounded by a

85.
White House Daily Press Briefing, Remarks of Kirstjen Nielsen (June
18, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?447252-1/homeland-security-secretarynielsen-calls-congress-fix-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/CJ5G-585M] (“If an
American were to commit a crime anywhere in the United States, they would go
to jail and they would be separated from their family. This is not a controversial
idea.”).
86.
There are circumstances when children of an arrested adult may be
taken into state custody pending placement with a relative or suitable guardian,
or when children of a convicted adult may be placed into government custody or
foster care following a best interests adjudication. But these processes are
articulated in state law and policy and are conducted on a case-by-case basis.
Children’s custody as a result of criminal prosecution of an adult is not a blanket
government policy to deter crime, nor is it a permissible additional punishment
with respect to the prosecuted adult.
87.
So far, assertions of children’s rights to prevent the deportation of
parents who have been convicted of crimes have not been successful at the circuit
court level. See Payne-Barahona v. Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007). That
situation is distinguishable from the border separation situation, however,
because in that case, due process was provided to the adult, who had been
convicted of a felony, and a deportation order was issued. In the circumstance of
separation at the border, legitimate asylum claims have not yet been adjudicated.
And, with respect to children’s indefinite government detention, the children have
done nothing wrong.
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hostile sentiment,” are entitled to constitutional due process.88
Children cannot be denied due process or “deprived arbitrarily of life
or liberty.”89 For younger children, the right to due process may be
assessed in terms of their right to a caregiving relationship and
caregiving interests.90 For older children—an area in which there has
been more judicial consideration—courts have considered the due
process they are entitled to in the context of juvenile justice.91 In
1967, the Supreme Court in In re Gault recognized the potentially
harmful consequences of government detention on a child. No matter
the “euphemism” used for the place of detention,
an institution of confinement in which the child is
incarcerated for a greater or lesser time . . . [can
result in] his world becom[ing] ‘a building with
whitewashed
walls,
regimented
routine
and
institutional hours . . . [i]nstead of mother and father
and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates,
his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees . . . .92
Thus, over fifty years ago, the Court understood the gravity of
placing a child in government institutions, and the constitutional
necessity of providing that child with due process before taking that
life-altering, drastic step. Genuine due process must be afforded to
children.93 If minors accused of crimes are entitled to due process to
ensure they are not unjustly detained, then minors who have
committed no crime themselves, and were brought to the United

88.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1932) (the infamous Scottsboro
Boys case wherein the Supreme Court held that the youths were entitled to
counsel in the capital case against them).
89.
Dailey, supra note 81, at 2100.
90.
See id. at 2104 (articulating an argument that children have a
fundamental constitutional right in the caregiving relationship). An adoption of
Dailey’s argument would lead to the assessment that due process protects
children from “state intervention into established caregiving relationships” which
would be relevant to the practice of detaining children separately from parents for
an indefinite amount of time following separation at the border. Further, Dailey
articulates an argument that children may have “affirmative constitutional rights
to a minimum level of caregiving services from the state”, which would be relevant
to the allegations of inadequate safe and sanitary conditions that were revealed
through media reports in 2019. Id.
91.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (noting that juveniles are entitled to
due process).
92.
Id. at 27.
93.
Id. at 28 (“Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not
justify a kangaroo court.”).
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States by an adult, are entitled to due process94 before they are
separated from their parent or caregiver and indefinitely detained by
the government, both acts that infringe on their liberty.
In addition to a right to due process, children also arguably
have anticipatory rights to future liberty. The idea of anticipatory
rights pertains to protecting rights for children to exercise once they
are fully developed and capable of exercising them; it is, in essence,
protecting their future exercise of their rights, in trust.95 Numerous
pediatric experts have explained how the separation from the parent
at the border and subsequent detention of children in government
facilities may cause long-term damage, especially to young children.
The American Academy of Pediatrics has warned that detained
children face negative physical and emotional consequences.96
Unexpected separation from a parent and indefinite detention may
cause lasting damage to children’s development. Using an
anticipatory rights framework suggests that denial of liberty at young
ages can cause long-term damage to children’s development later.97
Thus, the government policy of separation and detention not only
infringes on the child’s immediate liberty but also on that child’s
future development, which can affect the grown child’s full exercise of
his or her liberty.
Apart from limitations on separating parents from children,
there are also limits on the practice of holding hearings regarding
children without their parent or guardian present.98 Due process for

94.
Consider what this would look like: what is an acceptable due process
or adjudication process for children at the border? At least, the law could mandate
reasonable efforts by government officials to promptly: identify if the person they
arrived with is a parent, contact a parent or family member in the United States,
and place the child with the parent for a period of time.
95.
Dailey, supra note 81, at 2144.
96.
Julie M. Linton et al., Detention of Immigrant Children, PEDIATRICS,
Apr. 2017, 1, at 6, https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/139/5/
e20170483.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB8K-SKZF].
97.
Laurence D. Houlgate, Three Concepts of Children’s Constitutional
Rights: Reflections on the Enjoyment Theory, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 77, 86–88 (1999)
(articulating a theory of anticipatory rights as a right-in-trust, “younger children
are persons in the sense that they have the right to be provided with
opportunities and conditions assuring the full enjoyment of their constitutional
rights when they acquire the characteristics of adult persons.”).
98.
See Christina Jewett & Shefali Luthra, Immigrant Toddlers Ordered to
Appear in Court Alone, TEX. TRIB. (June 27, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/
2018/06/27/immigrant-toddlers-ordered-appear-court-alone/
[https://perma.cc/
5CGL-ELJG].
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children99 must take into account that they are generally not
recognized as capable of making important decisions for
themselves.100 This is particularly true of young children. Thus, the
government’s practice of holding hearings adjudicating the rights and
status of children without their parent or guardian present should be
impermissible, unless the government has taken meaningful steps to
locate the parent or adult with a substantial relationship with the
child.
Whether our analysis rests more on the children’s rights
framework which developed in the 1970s, or the parent’s rights
framework that evolved in the 1980s, the consequence of applying
either framework is that children may not be detained apart from
their parent absent an individualized assessment that this is in the
child’s best interest. No such assessment appears to have been
implemented to precede the government’s separation and detention of
children affected by the family separation policy.

D. Constitutional Rights of Non-U.S. Persons Inside the United
States
Separate from considering the rights of families, an analysis
of the rights of migrant families must take into account that the
Constitution protects non-citizens. In short, all persons present on
U.S. territory have constitutional rights. The moment a non-U.S.
citizen enters the United States, that person has certain basic
constitutional rights by virtue of his or her territorial presence.101
The development of constitutional law involving non-U.S.
persons has often involved the Fourth Amendment.102 The Supreme
99.
Migrant children are particularly vulnerable: they are likely at a
language disadvantage in the United States and may have been already subject to
traumatic experiences in their home country or in transit to the U.S. border. For
those reasons, the government should be under an enhanced obligation to ensure
that the law and policies that apply to consideration of their cases and their
physical and emotional care be highly regulated and implemented with care. The
law should protect the most vulnerable.
100.
See Dailey, supra note 81, at 2131, 2133–34.
101.
This was, of course, an underlying reason for detaining 9/11-era
terrorist detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and not in the territorial United
States. See Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 78
(2011).
102.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1984) (recognizing respect for legal rights as a longstanding understanding in
immigration enforcement). The Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreign
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Court has articulated distinctions between the application of
constitutional protections based on nationality (U.S. citizen or
national, or not) and location (inside the United States or a territory
subject to U.S. de facto sovereignty, or not). Although case law
currently gives CBP broad search and seizure authority at the border
and within a 100-mile border zone inside the territorial United
States, that does not mean that constitutional rights do not apply to
individuals within the territory. Rather, the balancing tests used to
determine when invasions of privacy (for example) are consistent
with the Fourth Amendment take into consideration the context of
border enforcement, resulting in less robust protections.
While Fourth Amendment case law provides substantial
examples of protecting rights of non-U.S. persons at and near the
border, aliens also “have a wide range of rights under the
Constitution,” including (but not limited to) First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights.103 The most relevant rights at
issue for family separation are Fifth Amendment due process rights.
Migrant children and families detained by the U.S. government are
entitled to some base level of due process before they are separated.
The U.S. government may not keep children in sustained government
custody absent due process. This entitlement to due process
constrains the government’s actions even before the underling
adjudication of the entrants’ immigration or asylum claim. In
Zadvydas v. Davis, for example, the Supreme Court considered a nonU.S. citizen’s challenge to detention that stretched beyond ninety
days.104 Although the Supreme Court recently declined to read into

persons in foreign lands, when that individual has no substantial connection to
the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75
(1990); cf. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (resident alien is
a “person” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (resident aliens entitled to Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (Fourteenth
Amendment protects resident aliens).
103.
Ilya Somin, The Constitutional Rights of Noncitizens, LEARN LIBERTY
(Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.learnliberty.org/blog/t-he-constitutional-rights-ofnoncitizens/ [https://perma.cc/XZM5-PEGF] (arguing against the claim that
noncitizens in the immigration context are not afforded constitutional rights); see
also Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The
Plenary Power Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J.
13, 15–17 (2003) (discussing the Chinese exclusion cases and the impact of the
“plenary power” doctrine on immigration law).
104.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The decision only concerned
detention of aliens who had previously been admitted to the U.S. and later
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the INA a six-month limit on immigration detention without bond,105
the Zadvydas court recognized that indefinite detention merits severe
constitutional inquiry:
[I]ndefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause forbids the government to “depriv[e]
any person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of
law.” Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause
protects.106
Once an alien is inside the United States, at the very least,
due process applies.107 This applies even once individuals are in
facilities operated near the border by DHS.
The punitive nature of migrant family separation further
suggests its unconstitutionality.108 The Trump Administration’s
family separation policy was punitive.109 For over 120 years it has
been settled law that the government may not inflict a harsh
punishment on an alien in conjunction with removal proceedings. In
Wong Wing v. United States, the Court considered whether an alien
ordered removed could be subject to a year of hard labor. The
question before the Court was whether, in the course of implementing
a government policy geared toward controlling illegal immigration,
the punitive measure of hard physical labor could be applied. The
Court rejected such punishment, whether of hard labor or of

ordered removed; it did not consider detention circumstances for individuals who
had not yet been granted lawful admission to the U.S.
105.
Rodriguez v. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830, 845–46 (2018).
106.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
107.
Id. at 693 (“[O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance
changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary or permanent.”).
108.
Id. at 692 (holding that the government may not detain aliens ordered
deported indefinitely: “the serious constitutional problem arising out of a statute
that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent,
deprivation of human liberty without any such protection is obvious.”).
109.
The authors are not alone in characterizing the intent of the family
separation policy as punitive. The American Bar Association’s Commission on
Immigration published an extensive memo characterizing it as such. See
Background on Separation of Families and Prosecution of Migrants at the
Southwest Border, AMER. B. ASSOC. (July 31, 2018), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/public_interest/immigration/resources/memo-on-family-separation/
[https://perma.cc/HK4Y-CWPU].
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confiscation of property.110 Thus, even if an alien is found guilty of the
crime of illegal entry, a punitive act by the government is not
permitted. Certainly, separating parent from child is more punitive
than confiscation of property, both for the parent and the child.
Separation of a child from a parent causes “irreparable harm”111 and
amounts to the punitive conduct prohibited by Wong Wing.

III. THE REACH OF DOMESTIC U.S. LAW FOR DEALING WITH
WRONGFUL FAMILY SEPARATION IN THE IMMIGRATION SETTING
As outlined in Part I, the Trump Administration separated
thousands of children and parents, acting with extreme hostility and
subjecting both children and parents to harsh, frightening, and
sometimes unsafe conditions. Vigorous application of existing
domestic law can and must be used to stop family separations, to
deter their reoccurrence, to reunify separated families, and to
compensate both children and adults for the serious harms suffered.
This section discusses how U.S. domestic civil law can advance these
goals, though we also posit that a legislatively-created program might
achieve them more expeditiously than sole reliance on existing law.
Congress could take action to enhance and build upon other preexisting domestic legal avenues to end family separation, a matter we
turn to in the conclusion of this Article.
Injunctive relief has been the most immediate tool for halting
the government’s unlawful family separation practices. The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other groups have brought suits
seeking a variety of judicial prohibitions and declarations meant to
end family separation and reunify those wrongfully parted from one
another. Resting on constitutional grounds, courts have declared the
Trump family separations unlawful. Despite this, individual claims
rooted in constitutional rights are unlikely to yield recovery for
damages inflicted on parents and children. Common law tort claims
afford the best chance at corrective justice for individual parents and
children, with the government paying money damages to those
injured by its policy and practice of family separation. We argue here
that plaintiffs would be very likely to succeed on such claims and
might realize large jury awards.
110.
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (noting that due
process provisions of the Constitution “are universal in their application to all
persons . . . without regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality”).
111.
See Leiva Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2011);
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017).
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A. Class Action Seeking Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Based
on Constitutional and Statutory Law
Attention to the Trump Administration’s combination of zero
tolerance and family separation as a deterrent to lawful immigration
spiked in June 2018.112 As noted above, on June 6, 2018, in Ms. L. v.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter Ms. L. v.
ICE), Judge Dana Sabraw of the Southern District of California
recognized the validity of a constitutional claim against the U.S.
government brought by the ACLU on behalf of separated parents.113
Later that month, Judge Sabraw certified a class action to litigate
whether the Trump Administration had violated the substantive due
process right of class members to family integrity. The court next
granted plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and for a preliminary
injunction, and ordered reunification of the children in custody of the
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) with their parents within thirty
days.114 Rather than litigate these matters to a conclusion, the U.S.
government entered into a negotiated working agreement under the
court’s supervision to implement the relief ordered by the court.115
Defendants in Ms. L. v. ICE include all the federal agencies
involved in setting and implementing the policies that caused
immigrant families to be separated as well as a range of specific
people, who, acting in their official capacities, set and operationalized
these policies.116

112.
See Aaron Hegarty, Timeline: Immigrant Children Separated From
Families at the Border, USA TODAY (June 27, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/2018/06/27/immigrant-children-family-separation-bordertimeline/734014002/ [https://perma.cc/4V2K-TVU7].
113.
Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F.Supp.3d 1149,
1168 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (dismissing claims premised on the Administrative
Procedure Act and various immigration and asylum statutes while allowing the
constitutional claim to proceed).
114.
As explained in Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330
F.R.D. 284, 286 (S.D. Cal. 2019).
115.
Pending Agreement, Part 2, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428 (S.D. Cal. 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/msl-v-ice-pending-agreement-part-2 [https://perma.cc/LQ2V-TSJU].
116.
Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal.
2019). Defendants included, in addition to ICE, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), the then-Acting Director of ICE, a
number of ICE Field Office Directors in San Diego and El Paso, the thenSecretary of DHS, the then-Attorney General of the United States, the Director of
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The Ms. L. v. ICE plaintiffs originally sought a wider range of
declaratory and injunctive relief than is currently being implemented.
The complaint requested a pronouncement from the court that
Trump-era family separation was illegal, and sought a prohibition of
any further family separation. The court granted both these
measures. But the court’s current injunction does not extend to other
steps originally requested in the complaint, such as that the U.S.
government either release parents and their children from detention
together or hold detained families together in the same facility; that
the U.S. refrain from deporting otherwise removable parents from the
U.S. until they are united with their children or the parents
knowingly and voluntarily have decided they do not want their
children removed with them; and that the U.S. discontinue further
removals of parents until class members have had an opportunity to
confer with legal counsel and a reasonable opportunity to pursue
asylum.
The court also ultimately defined the class covered by its
orders somewhat differently from the group specified in the ACLU’s
original request for class certification.117 Originally, the only parents
included were those who had entered the U.S. and were continuously
present in the U.S. from June 26, 2018 onward.118 Later, when it
became apparent that the government had adopted its family
separation tactics earlier than that date, the court amended the class
to include parents who had arrived earlier and been separated from
their children.119
To comply with the court’s orders, the government agreed to
make concrete reunification efforts and to spell out avenues to asylum
hearings for parents. Efforts to implement all of these measures are
ongoing, taking place under Judge Sabraw’s supervision of the case.
Meanwhile, the ACLU continues to pursue relief for two
classes related to the one certified in Ms. L. v. ICE. In Padilla v. U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter Padilla v.
ICE),120 the court certified a “credible fear interview class” and a
USCIS, the then-Acting Commissioner of CBP, CBP Field Directors in San Diego
and El Paso, the then-Secretary of HHS, and the then-Director of ORR.
117.
Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428, 2018
WL 3155677 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018).
118.
Id. at 287.
119.
Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330 F.R.D. 284, 287 (S.D.
Cal. 2019).
120.
Order Granting Class Certification, Padilla v. U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enf’t, No. 2:18-cv-00928 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2019), https://american
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“bond hearing class.” Both classes seek injunctive relief for adult
asylum seekers, including parents who were separated from their
children by ICE. The relief sought relates to the amount of time the
government can hold asylum seekers in detention without, first,
making a determination of whether the putative asylee has a credible
fear of persecution or torture if she or he returns to her or his home
country and, second, without holding a bond hearing for asylees
recognized as having credible fear. With regard to the “bond hearing
class,” the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
granted, in July 2019, a temporary injunction enjoining the
government from refusing bond hearings for asylum seekers who
have passed credible fear interviews and requiring a bond hearing to
be held within seven days of a determination that an asylum seeker
has credible fear of persecution if she or he returns home.121 Thus,
this injunction would prevent a parent in this class from remaining
separated from his or her child by virtue of being denied a bond
hearing. The government is resisting this result by litigating the
preliminary injunction issued by the District Court as well as by
pursuing the case on its merits.122 In short, the government is seeking
to extend some family separations by trying to make parole
impossible for asylum-seeking parents who have established credible
fear. Without parole, these parents cannot reunite with their
children.
Whether various injunctions will successfully reunify
separated families, result in lawful treatment of children and parents
seeking asylum, and deter the government from committing

immigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/litigation_documents/challenging_credib
le_fear_interview_and_bond_hearing_delays_order_for_class_certification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SQG-738M]; see also Federal Court Requires Immigration
Courts to Continue to Provide Bond Hearings Despite Matter of M-S, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Aug.
30,
2019),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
sites/default/files/practice_advisory/federal_court_requires_immigration_courts_to
_continue_to_provide_bond_hearings_despite_matter_of_m-s-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RAA-L5S8] (explaining the impact of the Padilla decision).
121.
Order on the Motions re: Preliminary Injunction, Padilla v. U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 2:18-cv-00928 (W.D. Wash. July 2, 2019),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/litigation_
documents/challenging_credible_fear_interview_and_bond_hearing_delays_prelim
inary_injunction_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFK3-4C6U].
122.
Challenging Credible Fear Interview and Bond Hearing Delays, AM.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL,
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/
challenging-credible-fear-interview-and-bond-hearing-delays
[https://perma.cc/
S4NK-ZKZK].
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B. Individual Constitutional Tort Claims: Bivens Actions
The central constitutional claim successfully asserted so far
by migrants who have suffered family separation is that the Trump
Administration’s policy and practice violated their constitutionally
guaranteed right to family integrity. As discussed in Part II, the right
to family integrity derives from the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of
liberty, with familial association long recognized as an integral
component of natural persons’ right to be free from governmental
interference. Prospective immigrants enjoy a substantive due process
right to family integrity.124 When a federal government official
invades this right and causes personal injury, a victim has, in
principle, a cause of action to recover compensatory and punitive
damages because of the availability of so-called Bivens actions.125
Bivens actions are a judicially created remedy against federal officers
acting under color of law who violate individuals’ federally
guaranteed rights and thereby harm them. Bivens is a federal
counterpart to Section 1983 constitutional tort claims against state
officers acting under color of state law. Named after the U.S. Code
123.
The ACLU has repeatedly had to return to court to ensure Trump
Administration compliance with the working agreement. See, e.g., Memo in
Support of Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction, Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428, 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal. 2019),
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/ms-l-v-ice-memo-support-motion-enforce-pi
[https://perma.cc/B3XY-66AA]. In addition, on October 3, 2019, the ACLU filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona to be a class
representative in a damages action on behalf of separated families and seeking
the creation of a victim compensation fund. See Zoe Tillman (@ZoeTillman),
TWITTER (Oct. 3, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://twitter.com/ZoeTillman/status/
1179805180059176961 [https://perma.cc/9AD3-GXCE].
124.
“A parent has a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in companionship with
his or her child.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted); see also Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330
F.R.D. 284, 286 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“Plaintiffs challenged this family separation
policy as a violation of their substantive due process rights to family integrity
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [T]his
Court . . . ordered reunification of the children in ORR custody with their parents
within 30 days.”).
125.
Named for Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that a violation of Fourth Amendment
rights by federal officers can give rise to a federal cause of action for damages for
unlawful searches and seizures).
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provision that delineates the cause of action, 1983 claims permit
recovery of monetary damages.126 Both Bivens actions and Section
1983 actions have been structured and inflected by a large body of
Supreme Court precedent. With regard to Bivens actions in
particular, this precedent has sharply limited the effective reach of
individual damage actions against federal officers who inflict harm by
violation of a constitutional right.127 So, even in the circumstances
acknowledged in the Ms. L. v. ICE agreement, immigrant parents and
children face an uphill battle to recover for their injuries arising from
federal officials violating their constitutionally protected right to
family integrity.128
The Supreme Court case creating Bivens actions was decided
in 1971, with the Court holding that individuals may have a judicial
remedy—including monetary damages—for harms arising from the
conduct of federal agents when such agents are acting under color of
federal authority.129 Bivens itself involved a Fourth Amendment
violation by drug enforcement agents. After Bivens, the Supreme
Court permitted recovery against federal agents for conduct violating
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the

126.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). The statute reads, in its entirety:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id. With the phrase “liable to the party injured in an action at law,” Section 1983
creates a cause of action for money damages.
127.
See infra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.
128.
See Alvarez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1208
(11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act was an
“elaborate remedial system” precluding a Bivens claim but noting that Bivens
actions might be available for claims regarding physical abuse or punitive
conditions) (internal citations omitted).
129.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388.
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law.130 The Court has also permitted Bivens recovery in a suit where
federal prison officials failed to provide an inmate with proper
medical care, thereby violating his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.131 However, since these
cases were decided, the Supreme Court has become resistant to
Bivens actions.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Ziglar v. Abbasi,132 a case that raised serious questions about the
viability of Bivens actions against high ranking officials in
immigration settings.133 In Ziglar, the Supreme Court announced that
it would not recognize Bivens actions in “new contexts,” a term the
Court defined very broadly.134 The Ziglar court also emphasized a set
130.
See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (recognizing a
Bivens claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment
when a Congressman fired an administrative assistant based on her gender).
131.
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–18 (1980).
132.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). The Ziglar plaintiffs were
non-citizens of Arab descent (or perceived Arab descent) who had been picked up
and detained without bail in the aftermath of 9/11. During their imprisonment at
the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), MDC employees subjected the
plaintiffs to harsh and oppressive conditions and physical abuse. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct.
at 1853 (“According to the complaint, prison guards engaged in a pattern of
‘physical and verbal abuse.’ Guards allegedly slammed detainees into walls;
twisted their arms, wrists, and fingers; broke their bones; referred to them as
terrorists; threatened them with violence; subjected them to humiliating sexual
comments; and insulted their religion.”).
133.
Federal appellate courts have also displayed hostility to Bivens actions
in the immigration context. See De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 374 (5th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (refusing to recognize Bivens remedies
in consolidated appeals for alleged Fourth Amendment violations, holding that
“civil immigration proceedings” constitute a new context for Bivens claims);
Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to
recognize a Bivens remedy against immigration officers for “unlawful detention [of
noncitizens] during deportation proceedings.”).
134.
In Ziglar, the Supreme Court held that the situation was too different
from prior cases permitting Bivens recovery to allow the Ziglar plaintiffs to
proceed against “executive officials” or even the prison warden himself. The Court
explained:
The proper test for determining whether a case presents a new
Bivens context is as follows. If the case is different in a
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this
Court, then the context is new. Without endeavoring to create
an exhaustive list of differences that are meaningful enough to
make a given context a new one, some examples might prove
instructive. A case might differ in a meaningful way because of
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at
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of policy guidelines for lower courts to use to limit actions that meet
the similarity criterion.135 There are, however, a few post-9/11 cases
that leave some potential room for allowing Bivens actions in the
immigration setting.136 A court might hold that the parent’s and
child’s claims are sufficiently similar to cases in which Bivens actions
have been allowed, and are sufficiently unrelated to the sort of policy
concerns raised by the Supreme Court in Ziglar, to permit the action.
Ziglar, however, provides numerous bases for courts to distinguish
claims based on family separation from established Bivens actions.
Whether Bivens actions brought by separated families would
surmount today’s judicial skepticism toward Bivens remedies cannot
be known in advance of litigation.137 In any event, given the
availability of a tort remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), the victims of the recent government family separation policy
and practice may not need to rely on Bivens-type claims to recover
damages for the injuries they have suffered.

C. Individual Tort Actions
The ACLU sought only injunctive and declaratory relief on
behalf of the class of immigrant parents separated from their children

issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the
extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond
to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or
other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the
risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the
functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential
special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859.
135.
Id. at 1857–58.
136.
See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 627 (5th Cir.
2006) (denying qualified immunity defense to immigration officer where
noncitizen alleged that immigration officer physically assaulted and arrested her
without provocation); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reversing dismissal of Bivens claims against immigration agents on behalf of
noncitizen killed in detention); Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“No remedy for the alleged constitutional violations would affect the
BIA’s final order of removal. Any remedy available to Mr. Ballesteros would lie in
a Bivens action.”).
137.
See Carrie Cordero, Legal Considerations for Separating Families at
the Border, LAWFARE (June 19, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legalconsiderations-separating-families-border
[https://perma.cc/A85E-3WUK]
(arguing that individual federal officials who engage in federal civil rights
violations in the course of carrying out family separation or overseeing children’s
detention may also be implicated in federal color of law violations).
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because of the Trump Administration’s “zero tolerance” policies and
the use of family separation to deter lawful immigration to the United
States. This approach made sense as an early response to the
combination of zero tolerance and family separation as an intentional
damper on asylum-seeking and other lawful immigration to the U.S.,
but it cannot achieve corrective justice for the victims of these
policies. Without requiring the government to compensate migrant
parents and children injured by family separation, there may not be
sufficient incentive for the government to fully disengage from such
activity. Common law tort suits are the most likely avenue to achieve
corrective justice for separated family members, thereby providing
compensation and the government with a financial reason not to
reintroduce the practice in any guise.
In February 2019, six asylum-seeking mothers and children
filed administrative claims with DHS and HHS for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA.138 As of late July
2019, five more families have given notice of similar claims.139 The
three most recent claimants are fathers separated from their
children.140 They are seeking “$3 million in compensation per person,
or a total of $6 million per separated family,” according to the
Southern Poverty Law Center, which is representing the families.141
If the government does not respond to the claims within six months,
the fathers can sue the government in federal court.142 With at least
four thousand children and their parents subjected to family
separation, the aggregate liability for the harms suffered could reach
up to $24 billion.143
138.
Press Release, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Announcing Legal
Claims Against Government on Behalf of Parents and Children Separated at the
Border (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/news/2019/
02/arnold-porter-brings-legal-claims-against [https://perma.cc/7ENC-S9V8]. For
specifics about individual claims, see Separated Family Members Seek Monetary
Damages from United States, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, http://americanimmigration
council.org/litigation/separated-family-members-seek-monetary-damages-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/K4Y3-F6V3]).
139.
See Family Separation, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/
our-issues/immigrant-justice/family-separation [https://perma.cc/M7ZZ-Z94Z].
140.
Madeline Holcombe, Their Children Cry at Night After Border
Separation. These Fathers Are Seeking Damages for the Harm They Suffered,
CNN (July 25, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/us/fathers-damages-borderseparation/index.html [https://perma.cc/9V37-7AFB].
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
We calculated this very rough number using the amount claimed per
family in the latest claims filed at the time of this writing and assuming a total of
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Typically, sovereign immunity would insulate the federal
government from tort liability. The FTCA, however, makes the
federal government liable for torts it commits when it engages in
conduct that would yield tort liability for a private person engaged in
such conduct.144 The FTCA specifically authorizes the award of
monetary damages to those injured by tortious conduct of the U.S.
government and its employees. While some intentional torts are
excepted from the FTCA, actions for intentional infliction of
emotional distress are permitted.145
The administrative-exhaustion requirement applicable to
FTCA claims bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until

four thousand affected families potentially able to make similar claims. Of course,
each family’s experiences would create different amounts of damages, most likely
some less and some more than three million dollars. We specify an aggregate
number here to highlight the scale of the potential of the liability, not to prejudge
the final amount that might be awarded after damage determinations at trial.
144.
“In order for a suit to proceed against the United States, a waiver of
sovereign immunity must exist.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
475 (1994). The FTCA constitutes a partial waiver of the federal government's
sovereign immunity, which permits a claimant to sue the United States for the
“negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2018);
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 115 n.4 (1979). “[T]he FTCA makes the
United States liable to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances, under the law of the place where the tort occurred, subject to
enumerated exceptions to the immunity waiver.” Levin v. United States, 568 U.S.
503, 507 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “If a tort claim
against the United States falls into one of the FTCA’s exceptions it is barred by
sovereign immunity.” Hernandez v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (D.
Colo. 2014).
145.
The United States can be liable for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. It is not one of the intentional torts explicitly exempted by 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) from the general rule of liability, and the Court must assume in
the absence of contrary legislative intent that the lists of exceptions in 28 U.S.C.
2680(h) is comprehensive. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 539 &
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 945–46 (D. Conn.
1977) (FTCA liability for invasion of privacy); see also Boger, Gitenstein &
Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An
Interpretative Analysis, 54 U.N.C. L. REV. 497, 519 (1976) (same); Crain v.
Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 211 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (“Inclusion of this intentional
tort in the law enforcement proviso of § 2680(h) is therefore not necessary to
create sovereign liability for this tort.”); Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79,
91–93 (1st Cir. 2009) (U.S. government not entitled to tort immunity for
intentional infliction of emotional distress on criminal defendants framed and
imprisoned).
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they have exhausted their administrative remedies.146 But after that,
an unsatisfied claimant can litigate, and, if successful, win monetary
damages.
Federal courts apply relevant state tort law to tort claims
against the U.S. government.147 Choice of law depends on the
geographical locus of the allegedly tortious events. State law on
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the strongest tort claim
separated families have, does not vary much. Whether families were
separated in Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, California, or elsewhere in
the United States, migrant families’ intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims will be treated similarly.148
The central idea behind this tort is distinctly moral. It is
meant to provide a remedy to those “intentionally or recklessly”
subjected to “extreme and outrageous conduct,”149 especially from
those who hold power over them.150 The conduct must go beyond
146.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2018); see Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134,
1139 (10th Cir. 2015).
147.
Pornomo v. United States, 814 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The
FTCA does not create a new cause of action; rather, it permits the United States
to be held liable in tort by providing a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.”);
Raplee v. United States, 842 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
2274 (2017) (explaining that “the FTCA merely waives sovereign immunity to
make the United States amenable to a state tort suit”); Hornbeck Offshore
Transp., LLC v. United States, 569 F.3d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“This statutory
text does not create a cause of action against the United States; it allows the
United States to be liable if a private party would be liable under similar
circumstances in the relevant jurisdiction.”).
148.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts was extremely influential upon all
U.S. jurisdictions’ development of the law of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The drafters of the current Restatement (Third) of Torts found cases
showing that forty-five jurisdictions, including D.C. and the Virgin Islands,
expressly follow § 46; three states (Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee) follow a
modified version; two states (Hawaii and Wisconsin) follow an earlier version; and
two states (Mississippi and Montana) reject the Restatement approach altogether.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46, at 22–23 (Council Draft No. 6, 2006).
149.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 2012). Note that recklessness suffices to
meet the scienter requirement for a successful claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See id. cmt. h (“Courts uniformly hold that reckless conduct,
not just intentional conduct, can support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional harm.”). Note, too, that once conduct is found to be outrageous, that
usually suffices to establish intent. See id. reporter’s note h. (“Extraordinarily
rare are cases in which extreme and outrageous conduct was satisfied but the
intent requirement was not.”).
150.
See, e.g., Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 409–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (“[O]utrageousness is more likely to be found where some relationship
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incivility or even ordinary malice. To prevail, a plaintiff must show
that the conduct “has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.”151 “Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
[or her] resentment against the actor and lead him [or her] to
exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”152 To make out and win an intentional
infliction of emotional distress action, plaintiffs must give detailed
and substantial factual evidence to prove these elements, as well as
the usual evidence on causation and damages required in any
personal injury litigation.
The facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ filings, and public reaction
to news reporting on these facts, indicate that plaintiffs stand a good
chance of recovering against the U.S. government and state and
private actors involved in family separation. To make clear the
strength of the potential intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims, we go into fine detail about one such claim below. The range
and force of the facts alleged drive home our view that, if these facts
are proven at trial, factfinders will conclude that “an average member
of the community” presented with such information would cry,
“Outrageous!”
To illustrate, let us consider one administrative filing,
presented on behalf of “A.P.F.” and his seven-year-old son, “O.P.D.”153
The father and son fled Guatemala because of persecution of the
father and the medical needs of the son, arriving in Arizona in mid-

exists that gives the defendant actual or apparent authority over another or
power to affect his interests.”).
151.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 1965);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 2012) (“Section 46 of the Second Restatement,
on which this Section is based, employed the ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’
standard. That standard has been widely adopted, has been employed
satisfactorily, and has become familiar. For these reasons, it is retained in this
Section.”).
152.
Id.
153.
Notice of Claims from Matthew J. Schlesinger, Partner, Covington &
Burling LLP to Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/apf_opd_cover_letter_sf95_att._a__final_redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/67KX-995T]. The account given in this
Article is drawn wholly from this source.
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May 2018. Both are members of the indigenous Q’anjob’al tribe.154
The family home in a remote region of Guatemala had been burned

154.
The Q’anjob’al consider themselves descendants of the Mayans. Like
all indigenous people in Guatemala they are among the country’s least well off, by
any metric, including likelihood of being subjected to racist persecution. See Maria
Martin, Killings Of Guatemala’s Indigenous Activists Raise Specter of Human
Rights Crisis, NPR (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/
killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-human-rights-crisis
[https://perma.cc/4CVF-AN3B]; Elizabeth Lowman, UN Special Rapporteur
Expresses Concern over Guatemala’s Treatment of Indigenous Peoples, JURIST
(May 11, 2018), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/05/un-special-rapporteurexpresses-concern-over-guatemalas-treatment-of-indigenous-peoples/
[https://
perma.cc/Z9PQ-XEFB]; Ellen Wulfhorst, Indigenous and Female: Life at the
Bottom in Guatemala, REUTERS (May 3, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-guatemala-women-indigenous/indigenous-and-female-life-at-the-bottom-inguatemala-idUSKBN17Z07N [https://perma.cc/X8S8-ACCX].
Today’s subordination and persecution of Guatemalans of indigenous descent
has deep roots. During the Guatemalan Civil War of the 1980s, the military
targeted the indigenous civilian population, killing up to 200,000 people.
COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, GUATEMALA: MEMORY OF SILENCE:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION: CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (1999), https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
CEHreport-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BHD-DL5T]. Eighty-three percent of
the fully-identified victims were Mayan. Id; see also Mireya Navarro, Guatemalan
Army Waged ‘Genocide,’ New Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1999),
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/26/world/guatemalan-army-waged-genocidenew-report-finds.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review)
(after investigating the Guatemalan civil war of the 1980s, the United Nations
concluded that the U.S. had aided the Guatemalan military, which had committed
genocidal acts against indigenous peoples). Guatemala’s civil war devastated the
country’s indigenous Maya communities. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Guatemala’s
Civil War Devastated the Country’s Indigenous Maya Communities, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-guatemalawar-aftermath-20180903-story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights
Law Review).
Twentieth-century elites in Guatemala had clashed with those of Mayan origin
since at least the 1960s. See Genocide in Guatemala, HOLOCAUST MUSEUM
HOUSTON, https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-guatemala-guide/ [https://
perma.cc/P32W-8DF5] (“Civil war existed in Guatemala since the early 1960s due
to inequalities existing in the economic and political life. In the 1970s, the Maya
began participating in protests against the repressive government, demanding
greater equality and inclusion of the Mayan language and culture.”).
While there is debate over the precise nature of the post-colonial legacy of the
Spanish conquest of the indigenous peoples of Guatemala, the dynamic of
repression of these groups by Spanish-speaking elites dates back to the country’s
colonial past. See, e.g., W. George Lovell, Conquest and Survival, in COLONIAL
GUATEMALA: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CUCHUMATN HIGHLANDS,
1500–1821, at 200–201 (3d ed. 2005) (examining the impact of Spanish conquest
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down in an effort to kill the residents, because of their indigenous
background and A.P.F.’s environmental advocacy.
In Guatemala, A.P.F.’s son, O.P.D., had already undergone
major heart surgery that was necessary to save his life, with funds for
the operation provided by a philanthropic organization. O.P.D.
required regular cardiology check-ups and possible occasional
emergency care, neither of which could be accessed from the family
home in Guatemala. Because of this and the ongoing persecution of
the family, A.P.F. decided to flee with O.P.D. to the United States. It
took the pair two weeks to journey from Guatemala to northern
Mexico, with O.P.D.’s health deteriorating along the way. When
A.P.F. and O.P.D. eventually crossed the border into the United
States, it was after midnight. Around two a.m., A.P.F. stopped to
build a campfire, to rest and to warm O.P.D. A.P.F. hoped that the
campfire would attract U.S. border patrol agents from whom A.P.F.
could request asylum. A Border Patrol agent did find the father and
son. The agent (described in the administrative filing as “tall” and
“light-skinned”) started screaming obscenities in Spanish at O.P.D
and A.P.F., who is five foot three inches tall. With his hand on his
gun, the agent called them “stupid fucking animals” and kept
demanding that A.P.F. explain “why you came to my country.” At
first, out of fear, A.P.F. kept his head down and said nothing. When
he eventually tried to tell the agent he and his son were seeking
asylum and that O.P.D. had a serious medical condition, the agent
did not acknowledge A.P.F.’s request or the information about
O.P.D.’s health. Instead the agent put A.P.F. and O.P.D. in the back
of a covered, air-conditioned pickup truck, where A.P.F. continued to
try keeping O.P.D. warm. There was a three-hour wait before the pair
arrived at a border patrol station.
The administrative filing recounts in detail the treatment
A.P.F. and O.P.D. received at the station, where agents told A.P.F.
they “did not care” about O.P.D.’s heart surgery or his current
symptoms and difficulty breathing. The agent who questioned A.P.F.
told him that he should not have come to “my country” because “you
do not belong here.” Eventually, A.P.F. cried and this made O.P.D.
cry. Father and son were forced to wear thin clothing even though
they were put into a cell known as a “hielera” or “icebox” because it
was so cold. Crowded with about thirty occupants, there was no room
in the cell to lie down. No matter how often A.P.F. informed agents
and colonial rule on the Sierra de los Cuchumatanes, a region of Guatemala at the
country’s northwest border with Mexico).
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that O.P.D. was in medical distress, the agents provided no medical
attention and eventually threatened to deprive A.P.F. of the small
ration of food being provided to detainees in the cell. This discouraged
A.P.F. from continuing to ask for medical help.
After at least two days in this cell, O.P.D.’s condition
worsened until he was severely choking. A.P.F. had to give his son
the Heimlich maneuver, at which point agents took O.P.D. and his
father to a hospital. There, O.P.D. was diagnosed with an acute
respiratory infection. A.P.F. and O.P.D. were returned to the hielera
after this hospital visit. Shortly thereafter, they witnessed an armed
agent come to the cell, summon another father and son, and then
shove the father into the cell and forcibly grab the son, while
demanding the father give up the child. The boy, younger than
O.P.D., was led away crying and screaming for his father not to let
the agent take him. This caused other children in the cell to cry and
scream in fear, and O.P.D. clung to his father, asking for reassurance
that this would not happen to him. A.P.F. became fearful that, were
O.P.D. taken, the boy would resist and endanger his precarious
health, so he coached O.P.D. not to struggle if agents came for him.
Later, three armed agents came to the cell and called A.P.F. and
O.P.D. to come to them. They forcibly wrenched father and son apart.
As agents carried him away, O.P.D. looked back at his father. O.P.D.
was screaming and almost fainting. A.P.F. saw “incredible fear” on
his son’s face and he believes O.P.D. saw the same on his. O.P.D.
screamed, “Daddy, why are you letting them take me?”
After this, A.P.F. and O.P.D. had no communication for the
next fifty days at least. The administrative filing describes the
unhygienic, crowded conditions of the cell to which A.P.F. was moved
for the first ten days of this period. Food rations were extremely
small. A.P.F. was in state of panic and anxiety about O.P.D.’s
whereabouts and health. He was not given any information about
these matters then or for the next three months from any government
agent. A.P.F. had suicidal thoughts even before the agents came for
him, manacled him, and transferred him by bus and plane to a
different detention center. From other parents, A.P.F. learned of a
possible phone number for O.P.D. and repeatedly attempted to
contact his son. The calls did not go through. Despite his own pain,
hunger, and discomfort, concern and fear for O.P.D.’s safety and
health remained in the forefront of A.P.F.’s mind. Now under the
control of ICE agents, A.P.F. was desperate. An officer told A.P.F.
that ICE knew nothing about his case or O.P.D.’s whereabouts and
that his son had been removed from him “for good.” A.P.F. felt
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“constant agony,” and lost hope of ever seeing O.P.D. again. After
about a month, A.P.F. and other detainees were brought to another
room and told to sign papers written in English. ICE agents refused
to explain what the papers said and told detainees they would have
“problems with ICE” if they did not sign. A.P.F. signed. Two weeks
later, ICE agents gave him another form, this time in English with a
Spanish translation. This form gave the option of A.P.F. being
deported alone or being deported with his son. According to A.P.F.’s
recollection, he signed that “he wanted to be with his son.”
After fifty days of separation, A.P.F. was briefly able to speak
to O.P.D. by cell phone, after advocates visited the ICE facility where
A.P.F. was held. This was the only time during a seventy-day
separation that father and son spoke. Meanwhile, A.P.F. was told by
his wife, who was still in Guatemala, that O.P.D. had been sexually
abused in the foster home in New York where he had been placed by
the U.S. government. This cast A.P.F. into a “spiral of negative
thinking” including “self-destructive thoughts.”
Eventually, in July 2019, A.P.F. learned of the U.S.
government’s “zero tolerance” policy from the news, which happened
to be on television in the room he was then in with other detainees.
The program reported that Judge Sabraw of the U.S. District Court
in California had ordered that affected families be reunified.155
Several days later, without explanation, the U.S. government
again put A.P.F. and other fathers in chains and transported them to
a new location in Port Isabel, TX. Several more days passed. One day,
officers returned A.P.F.’s clothes, took him and other fathers to a new
room and unchained them. There, thirty children were released into
the room, one by one. According to A.P.F., the children looked around
frantically, disoriented and crying. Eventually he saw O.P.D., looking
afraid and crying, at first unable to recognize his father. A.P.F. called
O.P.D.’s name. O.P.D. walked toward him, still seeming not to
recognize A.P.F. When he got closer, O.P.D. jumped into his father’s
arms. Overcome with sorrow, they stayed still, holding each other.
Eventually, O.P.D. started telling his father not to let “them” take
him away again. O.P.D. repeated this concern throughout the next
two days while he and his father were held together in Port Isabel.
Then, without notice to them, their U.S. sponsor, or their counsel, the
pair was released. They had no money on them and nowhere to go.

155.
Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp 1133, 1146
(S.D. Cal. 2018).
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They sought refuge in a Catholic Charities shelter until A.P.F.’s
brother, their U.S. sponsor, arranged their travel to him in California.
The effects of the events recounted above continue to inflict
manifest pain and suffering on A.P.F. and O.P.D. The boy is clingy,
moody, fearful, subject to tantrums—in contrast to who he was before
the separation. He is terrified of anybody in uniform and is reluctant
to leave his home. His father suffers from acute headaches,
something he did not experience prior to being separated from his
son. To the extent the harms of the suffered by A.P.F. and O.P.D. can
be traced to different and separate actions taken by CPB, ICE, and
ORR, the government might try, at trial, to argue that not all of the
damages claimed are proximately caused from the conduct that
constitutes family separation and satisfies the outrageousness
threshold. But A.P.F. and O.P.D. have colorable claims that all of
their injuries flow directly from the distinctive policies and practices
of family separation as applied to them.156 Evidence shows that the
government was aware of the medical consensus about the harms of
removing children from parental care and separated parents and
children, including A.P.F. and O.P.D., anyway. The government
seemingly failed to provide O.P.D. the care recommended by the
American Association of Pediatricians.157 In a tort action for
156.
There is a consensus in the medical community that family separation
can readily disrupt both the short- and long-term health of children, creating the
need for specialized medical care. See, e.g., Hurley Riley, The Impact of ParentChild Separation at the Border, U. MICH. SCH. PUB. HEALTH: PURSUIT (Sept. 7,
2018), https://sph.umich.edu/pursuit/2018posts/family-separation-US-border.html
[https://perma.cc/7AG4-WXL8]; Martin H. Teicher, Childhood Trauma and the
Enduring Consequences of Forcibly Separating Children from Parents at the
United States Border, BMC MEDICINE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6103973/
[https://perma.cc/M8HA-YMCS];
Sue
Coyle, Children and Families Forum: The Impact of Immigrant Family
Separation, 18 SOC. WORK TODAY MAG. 8, https://www.socialworktoday.com/
archive/SO18p8.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q4BY-M3Q5]; Patty Huang, What Are the
Long-Term Effects of Separating Immigrant Children from Their Parents?,
CHILDREN’S HOSP. PHILA. RES. INST. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://injury.research.chop.
edu/blog/posts/what-are-long-term-effects-separating-immigrant-children-theirparents [https://perma.cc/UT2D-KASP]; Key Health Implications of Separation of
Families at the Border (as of June 27, 2018), HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June
27,
2018),
https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/fact-sheet/key-health-implica
tions-of-separation-of-families-at-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/UQ3M-7DQ4].
157.
Linton et al., supra note 96, at 7–9. Among the many
recommendations not followed, key ones include: the elimination of exposure to
conditions and situations that will retraumatize already traumatized children;
keeping children with a parent or primary caregiver; not holding children at CBP
facilities because the conditions are not appropriate for their health; orienting
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intentional infliction of emotional distress, knowing disregard for
O.P.D.’s mental, as well as physical, health buttresses the evidence of
extreme malice, a key element in the claim.
Facts like those asserted by O.P.D. and A.P.F. provide the
sort of detailed basis necessary to assert a successful claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In fact, the facts we
recount are abbreviated compared to the administrative complaint
and to what would be pled at trial. A.P.F. himself relied on a paper
trail to ascertain what happened to O.P.D. while they were separated.
Presented with such corroborating evidence, expert medical
testimony, and credible testimony from A.P.F. and O.P.D., a
factfinder might well conclude that the forcible separation of the boy
from his father, the bullying, the verbal abuse, the refusal to accept
or provide important information, the inadequate food rations, the
freezing cold cells, and the delayed and inadequate medical care were
“so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”158
The government’s ability to address an influx of migrants and
asylum-seekers is not governed solely by domestic constitutional, civil
rights, or tort law. In the next section we turn to international law
applicable to deliberate, harsh, and widescale family separation used
deliberately to deter immigration to the U.S.

IV. PROTECTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Litigation in U.S. federal court to protect the rights and
welfare of migrant children at and within the U.S. border relies
primarily on judicially enforceable domestic standards, including the
terms of the 1997 Flores settlement159 and certain provisions of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, the U.S.
Constitution, and American common law.160 At the same time, the
United States is also bound to comply with applicable provisions of
children and providing them with information about what is happening and will
happen to them.
158.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 151.
159.
Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544
(RJK) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997); see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
160.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2018) (setting forth procedures for processing
unaccompanied alien children at the U.S. border and ports of entry); id.
§ 1232(b)(3) (providing for transfer of unaccompanied alien children to HHS
within 72 hours, “[e]xcept in the case of exceptional circumstances”).
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international law found in international treaties to which the United
States is a party, as well as in customary international law formed by
the near-uniform practice and views of states.
The enforceability of international legal obligations depends
on the source of the obligation, the availability of binding dispute
resolution mechanisms, and the willingness of states and other
international actors to condemn and respond to violations. Although
disputes regarding the interpretation and scope of international legal
obligations can arise (as they do with respect to domestic law), the
fact that the United States is legally obliged to comply with
applicable provisions is beyond question.161 Treaties to which the
United States is party, and customary international law rules to
which the United States has not persistently objected, are binding on
the United States regardless of their enforceability in U.S. courts.162
Although the prospect of judicial enforcement certainly enhances the
likelihood of compliance with applicable legal norms, it is by no
means the only factor that contributes to compliance. While debates
persist about how, and how much, international law actually
influences state behavior, states routinely invoke international law to
justify their own behavior and to criticize—and attempt to
shape—the conduct of other states.163
The Trump Administration has refused to continue
participating in certain multilateral agreements, such as the Paris
Climate Agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), and has been vocal in criticizing certain international
organizations, such as the United Nations and NATO.164 Yet, this
161.
A classic formulation remains Justice Gray’s statement in The Paquete
Habana that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
162.
See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (indicating that
“[n]o one disputes” that the cited decision by the International Court of Justice
“constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States,”
notwithstanding disagreement about its enforceability in U.S. courts).
163.
Contributions to these debates include Oona Hathaway & Scott J.
Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE
L.J. 252 (2011); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law,
International Relations, and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 1st ed. 2002); and Benedict
Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998).
164.
See, e.g., Chimène Keitner, Sovereignty on Steroids: International
Institutions and the Trump Administration’s “Ideology of Patriotism,” LAWFARE
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does not amount to a wholesale rejection of international law by the
administration, nor to a decisive rejection of U.S. participation in the
international community. The U.S. has long held a dual position as a
key promoter of international law and institutions, on the one hand,
and a powerful country that can withstand a certain amount of
external economic and political pressure, on the other. As former
State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger stated in 2007:
[O]ur critics sometimes paint the United States as a
country willing to duck or shrug off international
obligations when they prove constraining or
inconvenient. That picture is wrong. The United
States does believe that international law matters. We
help develop it, rely on it, abide by it, and—contrary
to some impressions—it has an important role in our
nation’s Constitution and domestic law.165
Bellinger went on to quote then-Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice’s convictions that “America’s moral authority in
international politics also rests on our ability to defend international
laws and treaties”166 and that “when we respect our international
legal obligations and support an international system based on the
rule of law, we do the work of making the world a better place, but
also a safer and more secure place for America.”167 President Trump’s
first Senate-confirmed State Department Legal Adviser Jennifer
Newstead echoed this sentiment in 2018 when she wrote that “the
United States continues to play a leading role in promoting,
protecting, and respecting international law around the world.”168
While one might take issue with the tenor of this characterization, it
is still fair to say that most civil servants, and some political
appointees, take their responsibility for ensuring the United States’
compliance with international law seriously.
The relatively “lower profile” of binding international law in
domestic legal and policy debates can be attributed both to a lack of
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/sovereignty-steroids-internationalinstitutions-and-trump-administrations-ideology-patriotism
[https://perma.cc/
U8SS-9JHH] (discussing former National Security Adviser John Bolton’s longstanding hostility to the International Criminal Court).
165.
John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser, The United States and International
Law, Remarks at The Hague, Netherlands (June 6, 2007), https://20012009.state.gov/s/l/rls/86123.htm [https://perma.cc/V95W-U6PM].
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF U.S.
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW iv (2017).
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familiarity with international law and to limitations on its direct
enforcement by U.S. courts. For example, the Office of Legal
Counsel’s (OLC) May 31, 2018 opinion on the President’s authority to
“direct airstrikes on facilities associated with Syria’s chemicalweapons capability” did not address the legality of such strikes under
international law.169 Former OLC head Jack Goldsmith opined that
“it is not surprising that OLC ducked that issue[]” given the difficulty
of reconciling the strikes with the legal framework for using force
under the United Nations Charter.170 That does not mean, however,
that international legal considerations do not, or should not, play a
role in this Administration’s decision-making process, whether or not
such considerations ultimately prove decisive. Whether the current
Supreme Court will take a more robust role in enforcing international
law remains doubtful. As Jack Goldsmith has noted, international
law arguments did not have a “discernible influence” in the travel ban
litigation, and were not made by litigants and their amici with the
vigor one might have expected.171 In Goldsmith’s view, “[t]hese
silences might be explained by Trump’s fervent nationalism and antiinternationalism, and the Supreme Court’s general (though not
inevitable) aversion to the incorporation of international law.”172 The
appointment of Justice Brett Kavanaugh is also likely to compound
the playing down of international law in Supreme Court arguments,
since Justice Kavanaugh has taken the position that “international
law has no judicially cognizable role in the U.S. legal system, except
where the political branches explicitly incorporate it by statute,
regulation[,] or self-executing treaty.”173
169.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion
for the Counsel to the President (May 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/
opinion/file/1067551/download [https://perma.cc/B3K7-63UH].
170.
Jack Goldsmith, The New OLC Opinion on Syria Brings Obama Legal
Rationales Out of the Shadows, LAWFARE (June 1, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/new-olc-opinion-syria-brings-obama-legal-rationales-out-shadows
[https://
perma.cc/8WRM-VCKZ]; see also Chimène I. Keitner, Explaining International
Acts, 63 MCGILL L.J. 1, 13–14 (2018) (discussing American attempts to justify the
2018 Syrian airstrikes and experts rejecting their purported legality).
171.
Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Administration and International Law,
113 AM. J. INT’L L. 408, 410 (2019) (reviewing HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2019)).
172.
Id.
173.
See Scott R. Anderson, Hayley Evans & Hilary Hurd, Justice Brett
Kavanaugh on National Security: A Reader’s Guide, LAWFARE (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/judge-brett-kavanaugh-national-security-readersguide
[https://perma.cc/T5U8-WBFW]
(describing
Justice
Kavanaugh’s
concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc in Al-Bihani v. United States).
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Despite these doctrinal and political hurdles, lawyers
representing migrant children and their families have long looked to
international law as an additional source of protection for their
clients, and government lawyers take account of international legal
constraints in advising on policy options.174 Any analysis of the
United States’ treatment of migrants and asylum-seekers would thus
be incomplete without a consideration of the United States’
international legal commitments. Although, as noted above,
international law rarely gives rise directly to a cause of action in the
U.S. legal system, the Charming Betsy canon of statutory
interpretation instructs courts to presume that Congress does not
intend to violate international law, including international human
rights law, unless it does so explicitly.175 Moreover, the United States
bears international legal responsibility for violations of international
law, regardless of whether such violations have been authorized by
Congress or have survived challenge in U.S. courts. It is axiomatic
that the inability to enforce an international standard through
domestic channels, or even the existence of conflicting domestic law,
does not absolve a state of the duty to comply with its international
legal obligations.
Multiple international legal standards are engaged by the
“zero tolerance” policy and by the routine separation of child migrants
and asylum-seekers from accompanying adults when they cross the

174.
See, e.g., Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee
Law: Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059,
1121 (2011) (arguing that “[i]nterpreting the INA consistently with the [Refugee]
Convention will invariably provide a more rights-protective framework than the
domestic immigration statute alone”); Miriam Sapiro, Advising the United States
Government on International Law, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 619, 619 n.1
(1995) (indicating that “[t]here is little doubt that international law is considered
in decisionmaking”).
175.
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) (holding that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains”). Lawyers have long
raised arguments in the immigration context based on the international legal
protection of “the right to family association and integrity.” See, e.g., Brief of the
Center for Constitutional Rights as Amicus Curiae Supporting PetitionerAppellant Alfien P. Gordon, Gordon v. Mulé, 153 F. App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2005) (No.
02-2051), 2005 WL 6426403 (arguing against a father’s deportation because
international law protects “the right to family association and integrity” and, per
Charming Betsy, “statutes must be construed in conformity with international law
absent a clear statement from Congress to the contrary”).
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U.S. border between ports of entry.176 As described above, the United
States initiated—and has continued—a practice of forcibly separating
minors from accompanying adults, while the adults are referred for
criminal prosecution for illegal entry.177 Compounding the harms
created by this practice, adequate records of separations where
minors were apprehended while in an adult’s care have not been
maintained, thereby effectively “orphaning” children and
dramatically reducing the prospect of family reunification.178 The
conditions of confinement of these children, as well as their prolonged
detention, also violate relevant international legal obligations
separate from the violations associated with the act of continued
separation.179 The acknowledgment by senior U.S. officials that these
measures are intended to be punitive and to deter would-be
immigrants from crossing the southern border also carries legal
significance, although the practice would still be internationally
unlawful even if it did not have a punitive intent.180
176.
According to one report, in some cases “immigrant families
are . . . separated after . . . presenting themselves for asylum . . . [even though]
Trump administration officials claim . . . they only separate families at ports of
entry [for] the safety of the child, or if they don’t think . . . that the adult is really
the child’s legal custodian.” Dara Lind, The Trump Administration’s Separation of
Families at the Border, Explained, VOX (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.vox.com/
2018/6/11/17443198/children-immigrant-families-separated-parents
[https://perma.cc/46LJ-KMT8].
177.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG18-84, SPECIAL REVIEW—INITIAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING FAMILY SEPARATION
ISSUES UNDER THE ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY 4 (Sept. 27, 2018). This practice has
continued, with a reported 700 separations carried out between June 2018 and
May 2019. See Lomi Kriel & Dug Begley, Trump Administration Still Separating
Hundreds of Migrant Children at the Border Through Often Questionable Claims
of Danger, HOUSTON CHRON. (June 22, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-administration-still-separatinghundreds-of-14029494.php [https://perma.cc/5WCS-T7HK]; Michelle Goldberg,
The Terrible Things Trump is Doing in Our Name, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/family-separation-trump-migrants.
html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
178.
Lind, supra note 176.
179.
See infra Section II.A.
180.
President Trump stated that his policy acts as a deterrent for people
coming to the United States: “We want a great country . . . . But when people
come up, they have to know they can’t get in. Otherwise it’s never going to stop.”
Later he said: “When you prosecute the parents for coming in illegally, which
should happen, you have to take the children away. Now, we don’t have to
prosecute them, but then we’re not prosecuting them for coming in illegally.
That’s not good.” President Donald Trump, Remarks at the National Federation of
Independent Businesses 75th Anniversary Celebration (June 18, 2018); see also
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The United States’ treatment of migrant children and
families is a legitimate matter of international concern, as the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights made clear in his June 2018
“global update” to the Human Rights Council.181 It is worth
cataloguing some of the criticism the United States has received for
this practice from the international community. For example, later in
June 2018, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States issued a resolution reminding the United States of its
international legal obligation to respect the human rights of
migrants, and especially children.182 In August 2018, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights granted a request for
precautionary measures received from six countries’ National
Institutions of Human Rights.183 As a threshold matter, the
Commission found that children who are separated from their
parents as a result of the “zero tolerance” policy are at risk of
“serious, urgent and irreparable harm” to the rights to a family life,
personal integrity, and identity guaranteed by the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.184 More recently, in July
Van Schaack, supra note 2 (arguing that footage from a 60 Minutes segment
corroborates that the intent of the family separation policy was to deter
immigration).
181.
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, Opening Statement by U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights (June 18, 2018) https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23206&LangID=E
[https://
perma.cc/3Q3J-XJDR]; see also Press Briefing Note on Egypt, United States, and
Ethiopia, UNHCR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=23174&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/B7HZ-FUEB] (indicating that
“the practice of separating families amounts to arbitrary and unlawful
interference in family life, and is a serious violation of the rights of the child”).
182.
Permanent Council Res. 1106 (2168/18) (July 6, 2018).
183.
Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 64/2018 (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2018/64-18MC731-18-US-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ETE7-PG95]. A complaint has also been filed against the United
States with the U.N. Human Rights Council by fifteen U.S. civil society groups,
although it is not clear that the Council will find the complaint admissible under
its procedures. See Human Rights Council Complaint Procedure Form, HUMAN
RIGHTS COUNCIL, https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/un-humrts-complaint_
062018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCT8-QJB4]. The same month the complaint was
filed, the United States withdrew as a member of the 47-country Human Rights
Council, although this does not in itself deprive the Council of the ability to
consider complaints against the United States. See Colin Dwyer, U.S. Announces
Its Withdrawal from U.N. Human Rights Council, NPR (June 19, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621435225/u-s-announces-its-withdrawal-from-un-s-human-rights-council [https://perma.cc/QQ8D-E8WH].
184.
Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 64/2018 at 5 (Aug. 16,
2018), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2018/64-18MC731-18-US-en.pdf
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2019, the new U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights decried
the conditions of confinement of refugee and migrant children and
adults in the United States, and made clear that children should
never be held in immigration detention or separated from their
families.185 Also in July 2019, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution on the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border in which it
invoked international human rights obligations and emphasized that,
among other things, “depriving children of their liberty on the basis of
their or their parents’ migration status is never in the best interests
of the child . . . and may constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment of migrant children.”186 Moreover, as affirmed by the E.U.
Parliament, “illegal family separations and the arbitrary and
indefinite detention of asylum seekers without parole constitute cruel
policies and flagrant violations of both U.S. asylum law and
international law.”187 Although not legally binding on the United
States, these pronouncements reflect a consensus that recent U.S.
practice does not comply with U.S. obligations. To date, other
countries have not adopted stronger measures to try and compel U.S.
compliance (likely because of an assessment that this does not
represent a high enough foreign policy priority to risk incurring the
[https://perma.cc/ETE7-PG95]; Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 5, May 2, 1948,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3710.html [https://perma.cc/3SGH-HFL6]. A
coalition of holders of U.N. “special procedures” mandates has also officially
communicated its concerns to the U.S. government about issues including “the
automatic separation of children from their families in violation of the best
interests of the child and their rights to liberty and family life.” Letter from
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention et al. to the U.N. (June 19, 2018),
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunication
File?gId=23913
[https://perma.cc/S3GH-B87V].
Among
other
possible
international law violations, the communication specifically calls out “the use of
immigration detention and family separation as a punitive deterrent of irregular
entry, contrary to international human rights norms and standards” and
emphasizes that “[t]he best interests of the child should be the paramount
consideration, including in the context of migration management, and children
should never be detained for reasons related to their own or their parents’
migration status, as detention of children in the context of migration constitutes a
human rights violation.” Id. at 3.
185.
Bachelet Appalled by Conditions of Migrants and Refugees in
Detention in the US, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (July 8, 2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24800
[https://perma.cc/5D8L-A87N].
186.
Res. 2019/2733 of the Eur. Parl. on the Situation at the USA-Mexico
border (July 18, 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-20190005_EN.html?redirect [https://perma.cc/AZL5-EU8X].
187.
Id.
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accompanying costs). However, there is no doubt that the United
States’ global standing—and its moral authority and ability to
persuade other countries to comply with international legal
standards—have been severely damaged.188
International human rights law governs how states treat
individuals within their jurisdiction. These standards apply
indisputably to all individuals who are on U.S. territory (regardless of
how they entered), although the United States generally maintains
that it does not also constrain the conduct of U.S. officials towards
individuals who are not present on U.S. territory.189 That said, the
United States’ exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction to prosecute
adults for illegal border crossings, and to hold adults and children in
detention facilities, clearly brings those individuals within the scope
of the United States’ international human rights obligations.190 The
rest of this section examines these obligations under four nonexhaustive categories: special protections afforded children; the
requirement of humane and non-punitive treatment; the right to a
family life; and the right to be free from cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment.191 It concludes with a brief discussion of the
188.
See, e.g., Tania Karas, U.S. Leads Global “Race to the Bottom” in
Shutting Door on Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, PRI: WORLD (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-09-17/us-leads-global-race-bottom-shutting-doorrefugees-and-asylum-seekers [https://perma.cc/Y4KJ-UPXP].
189.
U.S. Observations on Human Rights Committee General Comment 31,
U.S STATE DEP’T (Dec. 27, 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112674.htm
[https://perma.cc/968P-E6FX]. Other countries and experts disagree with this
interpretation and view this treaty language as encompassing both individuals
within a country’s territory and individuals within that country’s jurisdiction.
190.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 10, 13, 14,
17, 23, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees art. 16, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 16, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
191.
Other international legal prohibitions that commentators and
international bodies have suggested might be implicated include: the prohibition
on torture, the prohibition on forced disappearances, the prohibition on both
intentional and unintentional discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
national origin, and the right to personal integrity and to identity. This article’s
focus on the four categories of rights enumerated above does not diminish the
importance of ensuring respect for other human rights. See Beth Van Schaack,
The Torture of Forcibly Separating Children from Their Parents, JUST SECURITY
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61138/torture-forcibly-separatingchildren-parents/ [https://perma.cc/PT7J-V4E9] (torture); Van Schaack, supra
note 2 (torture); Amnesty International Statement for March 26 Hearing on “The
Department of Homeland Security’s Family Separation Policy: Perspectives from
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international right to a remedy, and highlights the inconsistency
between recent U.S. advocacy on behalf of vulnerable children outside
the United States, and its treatment of vulnerable children taken
from their parents by U.S. officials after they have crossed the
southern border.

A. Special Protections Afforded Children
Although the United States has gained notoriety for being the
only country that has signed but not ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), this does not mean that children in the
United States lack international legal protections.192 First, the United
States is bound by customary international law. While the content of
customary international law may be contested at the margins, certain
core prohibitions are acknowledged as legally binding on states
regardless of whether or not the state has ratified a specific treaty.
These standards include the categorical prohibitions on slavery and
torture, as well as other types of norms such as—under some
accounts—the “best interests of the child” principle.193 Second,
the Border,” AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.amnestyusa.org/ourwork/government-relations/advocacy/amnesty-international-statement-for-march26-hearing-on-the-department-of-homeland-securitys-family-separation-policyperspectives-from-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/BT9L-C7E9] (torture); Alonso
Gurmendi, On Calling Things What They Are: Family Separation and Enforced
Disappearance of Children, OPINIOJURIS (June 24, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/
2019/06/24/on-calling-things-what-they-are-family-separation-and-enforceddisappearance-of-children/ [https://perma.cc/DQH3-J2BM] (forced disappearance);
Letter from Working Group on Arbitrary Detention et. al. to the U.N., supra note
184 (discrimination); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Precautionary Measure No. 731-18: Migrant Children Affected by the “Zero
Tolerance” Policy Regarding the United States of America, ORG. OF AMERICAN
STATES (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2018/6418MC731-18-US-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFX3-LV89] (personal integrity and
identity).
192.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
South Sudan became the CRC’s 195th state party in 2015. There is a general
understanding that signatories to a treaty are obliged not to take actions that
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty until they have indicated their
intention not to ratify the treaty, but this prohibition has more rhetorical than
legal force when it comes to multilateral human rights treaties. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
193.
Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of
International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 230 n.111 (2003). Brilmayer and
Starr note that the “best interests” standard originally derived from U.S. family
law. See id. at 225; see also Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
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children in the United States benefit from human rights protections
in treaties that are not child-specific, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the United
States has ratified.194 Thus, although more extensive and detailed
provisions regarding the rights of child refugees and migrants are
more often found in so-called “soft law” instruments that are not in
themselves legally binding, the United States’ non-ratification of the
CRC does not affect its obligations under customary international law
and under other applicable treaties.195
The special protection accorded children under international
law is reflected in the ICCPR, which provides that “[e]very child shall
have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor.”196 As
the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
emphasized in a 2010 report:
The principal normative standards of child protection
are equally applicable to migrant children and
children implicated in the process of migration.
Accordingly, international law provides that all such
children be seen and protected as children first and
foremost, rather than letting their migratory or other
status, or that of their parents, dictate their access to
protection and assistance.197

(reversed on other grounds) (applying the “best interests” principle as a matter of
customary international law); cf. Starr & Brilmayer, supra, at 230 (noting in 2003
that, because family separation occurs in a variety of factual circumstances and
state practice is not sufficiently uniform, it would be premature to declare that
customary international law contains a blanket prohibition on family separation).
On the failure of the United States to respect the “best interests” principle in
immigration law more generally, see Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a ‘Best
Interests of the Child’ Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120 (2009).
194.
ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 1.
195.
Human Rights Watch Submits Comments on Proposed Rule Regarding
the Detention of Children and Families, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/06/human-rights-watch-submits-commentsproposed-rule-regarding-detention-children-and [https://perma.cc/F5X3-5U77].
196.
ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 24.
197.
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Challenges and Best
Practices in the Implementation of the International Framework for the
Protection of the Rights of the Child in the Context of Migration, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/15/29 (July 5, 2010).
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In carrying out deliberate and widespread family separations
beginning in the spring of 2018, U.S. authorities rendered
accompanied refugee and migrant children even more vulnerable by
turning them into unaccompanied children, thereby incurring
additional obligations for their protection and care.
Because children are among the most vulnerable members of
society, refugee law has long considered the particular plight of
children, including unaccompanied or separated children.198 However,
it is fair to say that the development of norms for protecting refugee
children and reunifying families has, until now, taken place
primarily, if not exclusively, in response to inadvertent family
separations caused by armed conflicts, natural disasters, and other
circumstances beyond the control of the destination state. The idea
that a destination state would intentionally separate arriving
children from their families for the purpose of deterring other would-

198.
Refugee guidelines have generally reserved the term “unaccompanied
children” for “children who are separated from both parents and are not being
cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so,” while
“separated children” are “children under 18 years who are separated from both
parents or from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver,” but who
may currently be with an extended family member. See Daniel J. Steinbock,
Separated Children in Mass Migration: Causes and Cures, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 297, 298 n.5 (2003); see generally Kate Jastram & Kathleen Newland, Family
Unity and Refugee Protection in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (E. Feller et
al., eds., 2003) (emphasizing the role of family unity and the dangers resulting
from its disruption); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Unaccompanied Refugee Minors: The
Role and Place of International Law in the Pursuit of Durable Solutions, 3 INT’L J.
CHILD. RTS. 405 (1995) (outlining the international efforts to protect child
refugees); HANNA GROS & YOLANDA SONG, UNIV. OF TORONTO FACULTY OF LAW,
NO LIFE FOR A CHILD: A ROADMAP TO END IMMIGRATION DETENTION OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SEPARATION (2016),
https://ihrp.law.utoronto.ca/sites/default/
files/PUBLICATIONS/Report-NoLifeForAChild.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2UJHCDQ] (arguing for changes to the Canadian immigration system due to its
practical implications and insufficient legal justifications); KRISTINA TOUZENIS,
INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANT CHILDREN (2008),
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_15_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
R2BQ-HKZB] (summarizing some of the most important protections provided to
child refugees); Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration
and/or in Need of International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 21 (Aug. 19, 2014) (setting forth the obligations that
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay must comply with in relation to the
human rights of migrants).
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be refugees and migrants has simply not been contemplated as a
serious possibility.199
The long-term harms caused to children by potentially
indefinite family separation, and by even short periods of
immigration detention, have been well documented.200 Consequently,
a wide variety of international instruments seek to avoid and to
remedy situations in which separation or detention occurs.201 The
199.
This is not to say that family separation is unknown as a tool of state
policy in other contexts. To the contrary, the historical experiences of indigenous
peoples in Canada and Australia, and the current experience of Uighurs in China,
make painfully clear that family separation has occurred outside this context. See,
e.g., Reconciliation, GOV’T OF CANADA (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1400782178444/1529183710887
[https://perma.cc/694V-VK6C]
(showing the Canadian government’s long-overdue attempts to apologize for and
redress historical wrongs); AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, BRINGING
THEM HOME REPORT (1997), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/
files/content/pdf/social_justice/bringing_them_home_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DJ58-KJKZ] (reporting on Australia’s “stolen generation”). International criticism
of China’s policy has been more muted, in part because of a systematic Chinese
campaign to deflect scrutiny. See, e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce, China Rebuked by
22 Nations over Xinjiang Repression, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rights.html (on file
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (noting that, since the United
States withdrew from the U.N. Human Rights Council, “[d]iplomats said there
was little prospect of another country leading a resolution in the council and
exposing itself to the political and economic retaliation China often threatens
against states that criticize it, especially in prominent forums”).
200.
See Linton et al., supra note 96; Chloe Reichel, How Detention Centers
Affect the Health of Immigrant Children: A Research Roundup, JOURNALIST’S
RESOURCE (July 22, 2019), https://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/
immigration/health-effects-immigration-detention-children/
[https://perma.cc/
Q7QM-55SR]; see generally Zachary Steel et al., Global Protection and the Health
Impact of Migration Interception, PLOS MED., June 2011, at 1 (describing the
particular harms of immigration detention on children).
201.
General rights that are potentially implicated by the U.S. policy
include: American Convention on Human Rights art. 5 (right to humane
treatment), art. 7 (right to personal liberty), art. 24 (right to equal protection);
San Salvador Protocol to American Convention art. 3 (obligation of nondiscrimination), art. 10 (right to health), art. 12 (right to food), art. 13 (right to
education), art. 15 (right to the protection of families). See American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. Childspecific protections include: American Convention on Human Rights art. 19
(rights of the child to “the measures of protection required by his condition as a
minor”); San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention art. 6 (rights of
children); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7.1 (right of the child to be
cared for, as far as possible, by his or her parents), art. 8.1 (right of the child to
preserve his or her identity), art. 9.1 (right not to be separated from his or her
parents except when such separation is necessary for the best interests of the
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CRC Committee has observed that “the detention of a child because of
their or their parent’s migration status constitutes a child rights
violation and always contravenes the principle of the best interests of
the child.”202 The U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
have all indicated that the detention of a child cannot be justified
solely on the basis of the migration status of that child or her
parent.203 Similarly, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Human Rights of Migrants has called on states to “preserve the
family unit by applying alternatives to detention to the entire family,”

child), art. 9.3 (right of a separated child to maintain personal relations and direct
contact with both parents on a regular basis), art. 19 (right to protection from all
forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, and sexual abuse), art. 20 (entitlement
to special protection and assistance provided by the State for a child temporarily
or permanently deprived of his or her family environment), art. 22 (appropriate
protection and humanitarian assistance for children seeking refugee status), art.
23 (rights of disabled children), art. 24 (right to access health services), art. 28
(right to an education), art. 37 (treatment of all children deprived of liberty with
humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a
manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age). Id.; see
San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 17,
1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25,
44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989). The United States is not
a party to any of these instruments, meaning that they are binding on the United
States only insofar as their provisions are reflected in other treaties to which the
United States is a party or can be said to constitute customary international law.
Provisions that arguably have attained customary international law status
include, at a minimum, the imperative of considering the best interests of the
child, the right to humane treatment, and the obligation of non-discrimination.
With respect to detained children in particular, see General Assembly Resolution
45/113 of 14 Dec. 1990 on UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
Their Liberty. Although U.N. General Assembly resolutions are not legally
binding, they frequently articulate international standards of conduct, including
standards that the United States has encouraged other countries to follow in their
treatment of vulnerable populations.
202.
Rep. of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2012 Day
of General Discussion on the Rights of All Children in the Context of
International Migration (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/CRC/Discussions/2012/DGD2012ReportAndRecommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GAE-FYXM]; see also INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP, ENDING
CHILD IMMIGRATION DETENTION, https://endchilddetention.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/IAWG_Advocacy-Brochure_Aug-2016_FINAL-web.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/5XSG-CNJ8]; Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of
Migration and/or Need of International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Aug. 19, 2014).
203.
See GROS & SONG, supra note 198.
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and to only resort to detaining parents accompanied by their children
“in very exceptional circumstances.”204
The Nelson Mandela Rules adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in 2015 also contain specific relevant provisions.205 Of
particular note, the rules provide that there shall always be a
standardized prisoner file management system, and that upon
admission of every prisoner, information shall be entered in the file
management system indicating “[t]he names of his or her family
members, including, where applicable, his or her children, the
children’s ages, location and custody or guardianship status.”206 The
fact that family separations were carried out by U.S. officials without
any plan or effort to keep track of family units or to identify which
children arrived with accompanying adults directly contravenes the
Mandela Rules endorsed by members of the General Assembly,
including the United States. The United States continues to
emphasize the importance of these rules, and even provides technical
assistance to other countries to encourage their compliance.207
The most generous reading of the family separation policy is
that children were rendered unaccompanied as a negligent and
foreseeable by-product, rather than a deliberate goal, of the “zero
tolerance” program. Although statements by officials instead support
the view that separation was itself intended as a penalty for crossing
the border illegally, even unintended consequences violate children’s
rights. A joint general comment by two human rights treaty bodies
makes clear that
authorities responsible for migration and other
related policies that affect children’s rights
should . . . systematically assess and address the
204.
Francois Crepeau, Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants, Rep. on the Human Rights of Migrants, A/HRC/20/24 at 11 (Apr. 2,
2012).
205.
G.A. Res. 70/175 (Jan. 8, 2016).
206.
Id. at Rule 7(f).
207.
Bureau of Int’l Narcotics & Law Enf’t Affairs, INL Work in the Field of
Corrections, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/inl-work-in-the-field-ofcorrections/ [https://perma.cc/3R2E-EY27]; see also Bureau of Int’l Narcotics &
Law Enf’t Affairs, Strengthening Criminal Justice Institutions, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://www.state.gov/supporting-rights-and-justice/ [https://perma.cc/
J8ZM-NCHJ] (indicating that “INL also participates in establishing global standards
on corrections policy, and is proud to have been an active supporter of the revised
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs),
known as The Nelson Mandela Rules, which were updated in 2015 after almost 50
years.”).
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impacts on and needs of children in the context of
international
migration
at
every
stage
of
policymaking and implementation.208
This imperative should flow self-evidently from due regard for
the best interests of the child—not to mention basic decency and
common sense.209

B. The Requirement of Humane and Non-Punitive Treatment
The United States has often been reticent to join binding
international human rights agreements for a variety of reasons,
including the concern that international agreements require
sacrificing “sovereignty,” and the conviction that domestic law fully
and adequately protects individuals within the United States.210 That
said, the United States has participated in, and even spearheaded,
“soft law” instruments, such as U.N. General Assembly Resolutions,
that articulate guiding principles for decent and humane societies, as
exemplified by Eleanor Roosevelt’s leading role in the adoption of the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.211 In addition to
208.
U.N. Comm. on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, Joint General Comment No. 3, U.N. Doc.
CMW/C/GC/3 (Nov. 16, 2017) (outlining state obligations regarding the human
rights of children in the context of international migration in countries of origin,
transit, destination and return).
209.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text; see also CRC Committee
Gen. Cmt. 14 (2013), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14 (outlining the importance of
prioritizing the best interests of the child when making policy decisions, including
by avoiding family separation). In a 2017 statement, the United States dissociated
itself from the “best interests of the child” principle in the context of international
migration on the grounds that it is “derived from the Convention on the Rights of
the Child.” This statement neglects the other sources of this principle, including
U.S. family law. See Laurie Shestack Phipps, Adviser, Explanation of Position on
Protection of Migrants, U.S. Mission to the U.N. (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-position-on-agenda-item-72b-a-c-3-72-l43-rev-1-on-protection-of-migrants [https://perma.cc/9YBG-FDAA].
210.
See, e.g., Greg Staff, Adviser, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Explanation of
Vote on A/C.3/72/L.21/Rev.1 on Rights of the Child (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-on-a-c-3-72-l-21-rev-1-on-rights-ofthe-child/?_ga=2.206287251.1275170924.1565159692-756070021.1562701866
[https://perma.cc/62D7-AC4A] (stating that “we underscore that the United States
fulfills its applicable international obligations to promote and protect the human
rights of migrants by providing substantial protections under the U.S.
Constitution and domestic laws to individuals within the territory of the United
States, regardless of their immigration status”).
211.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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helping to draft and promulgate the Mandela Rules cited above, the
United States also supported the New York Declaration for Refugees
and Migrants adopted by the General Assembly in September 2016.212
Although the Trump Administration subsequently disavowed the
principles enshrined in the declaration, it continues to represent an
articulation of widely shared goals and aspirations, as well as a
reaffirmation of established legal principles relating to the treatment
of migrants and refugees.213
The New York Declaration affirms countries’ “profound
solidarity with, and support for, the millions of people in different
parts of the world who, for reasons beyond their control, are forced to
uproot themselves and their families from their homes.”214 In
adopting the resolution, all 193 U.N. member states explicitly
“acknowledge[d] a shared responsibility to manage large movements
of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and
people-centred manner.”215 They declared that “[d]iversity enriches
every society and contributes to social cohesion,” and that
“[d]emonizing refugees or migrants offends profoundly against the
values of dignity and equality for every human being, to which we
have committed ourselves.”216 In adopting the declaration, all U.N.
members pledged to “ensure a people-centred, sensitive, humane,
dignified, gender-responsive and prompt reception for all persons
arriving in our countries, and particularly those in large movements,
whether refugees or migrants” and to “ensure full respect and
protection for their human rights and fundamental freedoms.”217 They
further pledged to “ensure that public officials and law enforcement
officers who work in border areas are trained to uphold the human
rights of all persons crossing, or seeking to cross, international
borders” and to “intensify support in this area and help to build
capacity as appropriate,” while recognizing that “while upholding
these obligations and principles, States are entitled to take measures
212.
G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants
(Sept. 19, 2016).
213.
Patrick Wintour, Donald Trump Pulls US out of UN Global Compact
on Migration, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
dec/03/donald-trump-pulls-us-out-of-un-global-compact-on-migration (on file with
the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
214.
G.A. Res. 71/1, supra note 212, ¶ 8.
215.
Id. ¶ 11.
216.
Id. ¶ 14; see also id. ¶ 39 (stating “[w]e commit to combating
xenophobia, racism and discrimination in our societies against refugees and
migrants”).
217.
Id. ¶ 22.
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to prevent irregular border crossings.”218 Of particular relevance,
states committed to protecting “the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all refugee and migrant children, regardless of their
status, and giving primary consideration at all times to the best
interests of the child,” and affirmed that this commitment applies
“particularly to unaccompanied children and those separated from
their families.”219 Once again, it does not appear to have occurred to
the declaration’s drafters that a country of arrival would itself cause
children to be separated from their families, thereby becoming the
most immediate threat to the safety and well-being of refugee and
migrant children who managed to survive the journey from their
country of origin.220
In addition to reciting the above political commitments, the
New York Declaration restates the core international legal principles
relating to immigration detention as follows:
Reaffirming that all individuals who have crossed or
are seeking to cross international borders are entitled
to due process in the assessment of their legal status,
entry and stay, we will consider reviewing policies
that criminalize cross-border movements. We will also
pursue alternatives to detention while these
assessments are under way. Furthermore, recognizing
that detention for the purposes of determining
migration status is seldom, if ever, in the best interest
of the child, we will use it only as a measure of last
resort, in the least restrictive setting, for the shortest
possible period of time, under conditions that respect
their human rights and in a manner that takes into
account, as a primary consideration, the best interest
of the child, and we will work towards the ending of
this practice.221
218.
Id. ¶ 24; see also id. ¶ 41 (affirming that “[w]e are committed to
protecting the safety, dignity and human rights and fundamental freedoms of all
migrants, regardless of their migratory status, at all times”).
219.
Id. ¶ 32.
220.
Cf. id. ¶ 29 (indicating that “[w]e recognize and will take steps to
address the particular vulnerabilities of women and children during the journey
from country of origin to country of arrival”) (emphasis added).
221.
Id. ¶ 33; see also id. ¶ 56 (stating that “[w]e affirm that children
should not be criminalized or subject to punitive measures because of their
migration status or that of their parents”); id. ¶ 59 (declaring that “[w]e reaffirm
our commitment to protect the human rights of migrant children, given their
vulnerability, particularly unaccompanied migrant children, and to provide access
to basic health, education and psychosocial services, ensuring that the best
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Despite the international consensus supporting these goals,
and the legal obligations underpinning many of them, the United
States sharply reversed course a year after the Declaration’s
unanimous adoption. On December 2, 2017, the United States
announced its “withdrawal” from the New York Declaration and
associated process for increasing global cooperation on migration, on
the grounds that “[t]he New York Declaration contains numerous
provisions that are inconsistent with U.S. immigration policy and the
Trump Administration’s immigration principles.”222
The U.S. government has taken other steps to make clear
that it does not regard itself as bound by the commitments embodied
in the New York Declaration, although it does acknowledge an
obligation to comply with already-existing laws. For example, in a
November 2018 explanation of a “no” vote in the U.N. on an omnibus
resolution that referred to the New York Declaration, the U.S.
representative objected to language in the resolution “regarding
alternatives to detention and the ‘need’ to limit the detention of
asylum seekers,” and reiterated that the United States “will detain
and prosecute those who enter U.S. territory illegally, consistent with
our domestic immigration laws and our international interests.”223 As
one of only two U.N. members (along with Hungary) to have voted
against the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, the United States also
emphasized its “understanding that none of the Compact’s provisions
create or affect rights or obligations of states under international law,
or otherwise change the current state of conventional or customary
international law.”224 That said, the Declaration and Compact also

interests of the child is a primary consideration in all relevant policies”); id. ¶ 70
(maintaining that “[w]e will also promote access for [refugee] children to childappropriate procedures”).
222.
United States Ends Participation in Global Compact on Migration,
U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. (Dec. 2, 2017), https://usun.usmission.gov/unitedstates-ends-participation-in-global-compact-on-migration/ [https://perma.cc/PY9HCQV5].
223.
Explanation of Vote in a Meeting of the Third Committee on a UNHCR
Omnibus Resolution, U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-in-a-meeting-of-the-thirdcommittee-on-a-unhcr-omnibus-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/3RV2-NKP3].
224.
Id.; see also Remarks to the UN General Assembly on the Global
Compact for Migration Resolution, U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-to-the-un-general-assembly-on-the-globalcompact-for-migration-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/WZK6-AJCK] (emphasizing
the U.S. concern that “Compact supporters, recognizing the lack of widespread
support for a legally-binding international migration convention, seek to use the
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reference certain obligations that are already part of conventional
and/or customary law. They could help catalyze other emerging
norms by shaping future state practice, if not that of the United
States.
Among other legally binding obligations, the 1967 Protocol to
the Refugee Convention (to which the United States is a party)
obliges the United States to comply with Article 31 of the 1951
Refugee Convention, which provides:
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties,
on account of their illegal entry or presence, on
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where
their life or freedom was threatened . . . , enter or are
present in their territory without authorization,
provided they present themselves without delay to the
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry
or presence.
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the
movements of such refugees restrictions other than
those which are necessary and such restrictions shall
only be applied until their status in the country is
regularized or they obtain admission into another
country. The Contracting States shall allow such
refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary
facilities to obtain admission into another country.225
Needless to say, countries routinely argue that their
immigration detention regimes comply with the letter of this law,
while advocates highlight the inconsistency between routine
detention intended as a deterrent and the prohibition on imposing
“penalties” on refugees on account of their illegal entry.226 Guy
Goodwin-Gill points out that, even apart from obligations under the
Refugee Convention, “[t]o impose penalties without regard to the
merits of an individual’s claim to be a refugee will likely also violate

Compact and its outcomes and objectives as a long-term means of building
customary international law or so-called ‘soft law’ in the area of migration.”).
225.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 31, July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6577; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
226.
See generally GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: NON-PENALIZATION,
DETENTION AND PROTECTION (2001) (analyzing Article 31 and incorporation of its
principles).
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the obligation of the State to ensure and to protect the human rights
of everyone within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction.”227
Multiple studies detail viable alternatives to immigration
detention.228 In the context of updating its directive laying down
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection,
the European Parliament reaffirmed:
The detention of applicants [for asylum] should be
applied in accordance with the underlying principle
that a person should not be held in detention for the
sole reason that he or she is seeking international
protection, particularly in accordance with the
international legal obligations of the Member States
and with Article 31 of the Geneva Convention.
Applicants may be detained only under very clearly
defined exceptional circumstances laid down in this
Directive and subject to the principle of necessity and
proportionality with regard to both to the manner and
the purpose of such detention.229
Moreover, “[a]pplicants who are in detention should be
treated with full respect for human dignity and their reception should
be specifically designed to meet their needs in that situation.”230
With respect to children in particular, the EU Directive
provides that “[t]he best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration for Member States when implementing the provisions
of this Directive that involve minors,” and that “Member States shall
ensure a standard of living adequate for the minor’s physical, mental,
spiritual, moral and social development.”231 Critically, “Member
227.
Id. at 2; see ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 2(1).
228.
See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUR., HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION: LEGAL
AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION IN THE
CONTEXT OF MIGRATION (2017), https://rm.coe.int/legal-and-practical-aspects-ofeffective-alternatives-to-detention-in-/16808f699f
[https://perma.cc/5K74-EXD5]
(describing alternatives); G.A. Res. 64/142, Annex (Feb. 24, 2010) (emphasizing
that, among other imperatives, “[c]hildren must be treated with dignity and
respect at all times and must benefit from effective protection from abuse, neglect
and all forms of exploitation, whether on the part of care providers, peers or third
parties, in whatever care setting they may find themselves,” and that “[i]n
accordance with the predominant opinion of experts, alternative care for young
children, especially those under the age of 3 years, should be provided in familybased settings”).
229.
Council Directive 2013/33/EU, ¶ 15, 2013 O.J. (L 180/96) (Eur. Parl.
and Council).
230.
Id.
231.
Id.; see ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 23.
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States shall ensure that minor children of applicants or applicants
who are minors are lodged with their parents, their unmarried minor
siblings or with the adult responsible for them whether by law or by
the practice of the Member State concerned, provided it is in the best
interests of the minors concerned.”232 Although the EU Directive as
such is clearly not legally binding on the United States, the
imperatives that detention should not imposed as a penalty and that
it must be done in a manner consistent with human dignity and the
best interests of the child mirror requirements in existing
conventional and customary international law.

C. The Right to a Family Life
Separating migrant children from their parents also
contravenes the children’s and the parents’ right to a family life.
Ironically, U.S. Senators who objected to ratifying the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC) emphasized their view that “the
primary safeguard for the well-being and protection of children is the
family.”233 The Conference of Plenipotentiaries responsible for
drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention, which included a delegate
from the United States, unanimously adopted the following
recommendation regarding the principle of unity of the family:
The Conference, considering that the unity of the
family, the natural and fundamental group unit of
society, is an essential right of the refugee, and that
such unity is constantly threatened, and noting with
satisfaction that, according to the official commentary
of the ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems (E/1618, p. 40), the rights granted to a
refugee are extended to members of his family,
recommends Governments to take the necessary
measures for the protection of the refugee’s family
especially with a view to
(1) Ensuring that the unity of the refugee’s family is
maintained particularly in cases where the head of
the family has fulfilled the necessary conditions for
admission to a particular country,

232.
233.

Id.
S. Res. 99, 112th Cong. (2012).
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(2) The protection of refugees who are minors, in
particular unaccompanied children and girls, with
special reference to guardianship and adoption.234
Multiple international treaties and declarations reaffirm the
central importance of preserving family unity, as long as doing so is
consistent with the best interests of the child.
The ICCPR, to which the United States is a party, provides
that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”235 It
further provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his . . . family.”236 The right to protection
of the family unit, at a minimum, requires scrutiny of any routine
separation of arriving minors from accompanying adults, and
prohibits
practices
that
result—either
intentionally
or
unintentionally—in the prolonged and potentially indefinite
separation of children from their parents.
Outside the immigration context, arrest and incarceration can
undeniably result in the involuntary separation of parents from their
children.237 This, in itself, is a major societal problem. U.S. officials
have cited this fact as a justification for treating the family
separation policy just like any other law enforcement operation that
results in the detention of adults who have custody of minor
children.238 Under current jurisprudence, family unity concerns also
234.
UNHCR, Note on Family Reunification, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/17
(Aug. 13, 1981).
235.
ICCPR, supra note 190, art. 23; see also American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, supra 183, at Art. VI; UDHR Art. 16(3) (providing the
same rights protection in additional human rights documents that the United
States has signed).
236.
ICCPR Art. 17(1); see also American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, supra 183, at Art. V; UDHR, Art. 12 (providing similar rights
protections in additional human rights documents that the United States has
signed).
237.
See, e.g., LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, PARENTS IN
PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN (2008), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/pptmc.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3D2-59R2] (reporting data on the rapid increase
of incarcerated parents, and their minor children, held in state or federal prisons
in the United States); see also INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF
POLICE,
SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN
OF
ARRESTED
PARENTS
(2014),
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Safeguarding-Children-of-ArrestedParents-Final_Web_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6MP-KS2R] (reporting on trauma
experienced by children who have parents in prison or in jail).
238.
Note that under U.S. law, individual officers can be held liable if
children of arrested parents are subjected to a “state-created danger” on account
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do not invariably prevent the removal of inadmissible aliens under
applicable U.S. law, even if they have minor children who are U.S.
citizens.
Whatever the doctrinal and policy justifications might be for
other government actions that result in family separation based on an
adult’s alleged unlawful acts, they do not justify the policy of
routinely separating migrant and refugee children from their parents
at the border without any individualized assessment or proceeding.239
The choices to close or dramatically restrict crossings at ports of
entry, to treat all crossings between points of entry as crimes that
warrant prosecution, to detain adults and children separately with no
reliable means of regular contact or even identification, and to return
adults to their countries of origin without any reliable information
about their children’s status or whereabouts, all show an utter
disregard for the international legal principle that families deserve
protection as such.

D. The Right to Be Free from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment
In addition to the above violations, the photos and first-hand
accounts of the treatment of children (and adults) in immigration
detention centers depict treatment that is cruel, inhuman, and
degrading under any reasonable interpretation of this concept, and
thus prohibited under the ICCPR and the Convention Against
Torture (CAT).240 Whether caused by inadequate allocation of
of the separation. See L. Cary Unkelbach, No Duty to Protect: Two Exceptions,
POLICE CHIEF, July 2004, at 12–14.
239.
Mass family separations have also been documented deep inside the
border, as a result of so-called immigration “raids.” See Angela Fritz & Luis
Velarde, ICE Arrested Hundreds of People in Raids, Now “Devastated” Children
Are Without Their Parents, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/immigration/2019/08/08/ice-arrested-hundreds-people-raids-nowdevastated-children-are-without-their-parents/ (on file with the Columbia Human
Rights Law Review); Sarah Folwer, Where Are Mom and Dad? School on Standby
to Help Children in Aftermath of ICE Raids, CLARION LEDGER (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://eu.clarionledger.com/story/news/2019/08/07/what-happens-children-peopledetained-ms-ice-raids-immigration/1947642001/ [https://perma.cc/ZD5Z-B9UC].
240.
Lizzie O’Leary, ‘Children Were Dirty, They Were Scared, and They
Were Hungry,’ ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/
archive/2019/06/child-detention-centers-immigration-attorney-interview/592540/
(on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). Some of these issues are
not new, but their scope and scale are. For previous reports on immigration
detention conditions, see, e.g., Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights,
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resources,
incompetent
management,
and—as
appears
likely—deliberate indifference, the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment is absolute and non-derogable. As the ICCPR
makes clear, “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person,”241 and “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman[,] or degrading treatment or punishment.”242 The
CAT, which the United States has also ratified, obligates states
parties to “prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture . . . when such acts are committed by or at the
instigation of or with the consent of a public official or other personal
acting in an official capacity.”243
The Martens Clause, which first appeared in the 1899 Hague
Convention on the laws and customs of war on land, famously invokes
“the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience”
as the minimum standard of protection absent directly applicable
treaty provisions.244 Although the scope and nature of the clause have
been debated ever since, the idea that—in peacetime as in
wartime—there are certain fundamental obligations that we owe to
other human beings as a legal, not just a moral, matter remains
essential.245 Although the Trump Administration continues to invoke
state sovereignty as a shield against international standards (while

Refugees and Migrants in the United States: Families and Unaccompanied
Children (July 24, 2015), OAS/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 16 (July 24, 2015),
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/2EQR-BTKF] (discussing conditions). On the carve-out for “lawful
sanctions,” see Ilascu v. Moldova, App. No. 48787/99, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46,1121
(2004); David Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel,
Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 L. & INEQ. 343, 391–93 (2011).
241.
ICCPR art. 10(1).
242.
Id. art. 7.
243.
CAT art. 16(1). The Convention defines “torture” as “any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person” for purposes such as “punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” Id. art.
1(1).
244.
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Preamble, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
245.
See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4,
22 (April 9) (“Such obligations are based . . . on certain general and wellrecognized principles, namely elementary considerations of humanity, even more
exacting in peace than in war . . . .”).
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at the same time selectively condemning other countries for violating
such standards), the idea that states no longer have a free hand to
mistreat their own citizens—let alone other countries’ citizens—is too
deeply enmeshed in the fabric of international law for such
disavowals to absolve the United States of any responsibility to act
with basic human decency. An anti-dehumanization principle,
grounded in international legal instruments and born of the lessons
of history, must guide official U.S. actions, whether or not it can be
enforced as such in a court of law.

E. The Right to a Remedy
Historically, aliens injured by another country’s government
could seek redress by having their own government “espouse” their
claim diplomatically. This avenue of recourse is more difficult,
however, when the victims are refugees and migrants who are fleeing
their countries of origin, although the right to consular notification
continues to provide a crucial—if far from adequate—check on the
abuse of foreign citizens.246 In the end, the most important leverage
other countries have in pressuring the United States to live up to its
246.
See generally Stefanie Grant, Consular Protection, Legal Identity and
Migrants’ Rights: Time for Convergence?, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI: MIDDLE
EAST CENTRE BLOG (May 17, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/05/17/
consular-protection-legal-identity-and-migrants-rights-time-for-convergence/
[https://perma.cc/CQD6-H8M7] (discussing convergence of consular protection and
human rights protection). Any foreign citizen arrested in the United States has
the right to consular notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR). See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24,
1963, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; see also Cindy G. Buys, Scott D. Pollock & Ioana N.
Pellicer, Do Unto Others: The Importance of Better Compliance with Consular
Notification Rights, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 461, 463 (2011) (explaining that
VCCR Article 36(l)(b) states that “if requested by a foreign national, the
authorities of the receiving state shall, without delay, inform the consular post of
the sending state that a national of that state has been arrested, committed to
prison or to custody pending trial, or detained in any other manner”). When ICE
conducted a massive raid at agricultural processing plants in Mississippi, Mexico
reportedly sent consular staff to the area to provide assistance to affected Mexican
nationals. See US Immigration: ICE Arrests Nearly 700 People in Mississippi
Raids, BBC (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-49275109
[https://perma.cc/7U26-PBEA]. But cf. Liz Robbins, Hundreds of Separated
Children Have Quietly Been Sent to New York, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/nyregion/children-separated-border-newyork.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (reporting that
“[t]he consulates in New York for Honduras and El Salvador said they, too, were
unclear how many of their young citizens were in the city, and of how to reach
their relatives back home”).
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own erstwhile ideals may well be political rather than legal. Although
the current administration seems somewhat impervious to “naming
and shaming” as a technique for promoting compliance with
international human rights standards, there will presumably come a
point at which the U.S. electorate will put pressure on leaders to
rectify the United States’ international moral standing.
It is also worth noting that, although most legal actions
challenging detention conditions in U.S. courts allege violations of
applicable statutes and provisions of the U.S. Constitution,247 at least
one civil suit has successfully challenged immigration detention
conditions under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)—a law which gives
federal courts jurisdiction over a limited number of international law
violations that “touch and concern” U.S. territory.248 The ATS was
originally enacted to allow foreigners in the United States to
vindicate their international legal rights in U.S. courts.249 More than
a century and a half later, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights emphasized that “[e]veryone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law.”250 However, as indicated above, the United States has been

247.
See, e.g., Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2017) (reviewing a lower
court decision in which Plaintiffs alleged that DHS detention center conditions
violated detainees’ constitutional rights); Complaint, Teneng v. Trump, No. 5:18cv-01609 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2018) (alleging that detention facilities violate
detainees’ constitutional rights under the 1st and 15th amendments, as well as
statutory rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
248.
Esmor Correctional Services Lawsuit (Re Immigration Detention
Facility), BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/esmor-correctional-services-lawsuit-reimmigration-detention-facility [https://perma.cc/CR44-J3H6]; see Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct.
1386 (2018).
249.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700 (2004); Anne-Marie
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor,
83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 464 (1989).
250.
UDHR Art. 8; see also G.A. Res. 60/146, Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005) (affirming the rights of victims
of gross violations of international human rights law to access remedies and
reparation); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY
AND REPARATION FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 287 (Oct. 2018),
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Universal-Right-to-a-RemedyPublications-Reports-Practitioners-Guides-2018-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP6Z-
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reticent to make legally binding commitments commensurate with
the aspirations it has endorsed in the Universal Declaration and
other “soft law” instruments.251 This is true of the right to a remedy,
which remains limited for both domestic and international law
violations.
The United States has not disavowed all concern for foreign
children. In an August 2019 statement delivered at the United
Nations, the U.S. representative declared as follows:
For our part, the United States continues to prioritize
child protection programming that is life-saving and
essential for survival as well as longer-term recovery,
resilience and healing, and we will continue to invest
in preventive and responsive programming to protect
children from violence. We know that the resumption
of familiar, safe, and nurturing routines, particularly
within a family, helps children heal, build resilience,
and better cope with stress.252
The standards of treatment the United States urges for
children in armed conflict must also be reflected in our treatment of
children seeking refuge in the United States. Indeed, the United
States declared in November 2017 that it remained “committed to
ensuring that migrant children, including those in the custody of the
U.S. government, are treated in a safe, dignified, and secure manner
and with special concern for their particular vulnerabilities.”253 In the
end, it might be less a question of imposing international standards
on the United States, and more a matter of ensuring—through the
mobilization of civil society groups, other governments, international
organizations, and the U.S. electorate—that the United States lives
up to the commitments it has already made.
2YAM] (outlining the rights under international law for remedies and reparation
via a practice guide).
251.
Eleanor Roosevelt, U.S. Delegate to the U.N., The Struggle for Human
Rights (Sept. 28, 1948), https://erpapers.columbian.gwu.edu/struggle-humanrights-1948 [https://perma.cc/QG7M-XCD7].
252.
Cherith Norman Chalet, U.S. Representative for U.N. Management
and Reform, Remarks at a U.N. Security Council Annual Open Debate on
Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) (Aug. 2, 2019), https://usun.usmission.gov/
remarks-at-a-un-security-council-annual-open-debate-on-children-and-armedconflict-caac/ [https://perma.cc/6TZ5-MPEC].
253.
Laurie Shestack Phipps, Adviser for Economic and Social Affairs,
Explanation of Position on Agenda Item 72(b), A/C.3/72/L.43/Rev. 1 on Protection
of Migrants (Nov. 20, 2017), https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-positionon-agenda-item-72b-a-c-3-72-l-43-rev-1-on-protection-of-migrants [https://perma.
cc/EFT8-RK2U].
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CONCLUSION
Both domestic and international law prohibit the deliberate
separation of children from their families as a means of attempting to
deter unlawful immigration. In addition to putting a definitive end to
the practice of family separation, and to ensuring that the conditions
and duration of immigration detention comply with domestic and
international standards, there are several additional legislative and
oversight avenues for Congress to pursue.
An immediate step that Congress can take is to enact
legislation mandating the reunification of any remaining children
separated by the policies implemented in 2017 and 2018, and any
additional children that have been separated since that time,
consistent with federal court order. While court order should be
sufficient, there have been substantial delays since the court first
ordered reunification and the completion of that process. Accordingly,
legislation is likely necessary.
Congress can also mandate mechanisms for children and
parents (or relatives or guardians) who are separated at the border to
be adequately tracked electronically through a system that is modern,
accurate, and interoperable across relevant government agencies.
Congress should also legislate requirements for a parent, guardian, or
appropriate representative to appear on behalf of children in
immigration proceedings. Specific legislation tied to appropriations is
needed under these circumstances—given the executive branch’s
unwillingness to put into place proper bureaucratic mechanisms to
promptly reunify families following the 2018 court order—to provide
appropriate parental accompaniment to children at administrative
hearings.
Congress should conduct additional oversight and inquiry to
determine if legislative action could expedite litigation, which is
building toward individual compensation for victims of the family
separation and zero tolerance policies and practices. Most simply,
Congress could explicitly authorize a Bivens action to address the
situation. In Ziglar, the Supreme Court made it clear that, with
Congress’s authorization, there would be no issue with extending
Bivens actions to so-called “new contexts.”254 Clarifying the
availability of Bivens actions for separated families would be a
significant step in the right direction, both from the perspective of

254.

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017).
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providing remedy for past actions, and as a deterrent for future
implementation of a family separation policy.
With additional hearings and oversight by Congress,
members of both chambers may come to the understanding that the
Trump Administration’s practice of intentional family separation
circa 2018 constituted a mass tort perpetrated by the executive
branch of the U.S. government. While there is controversy about
substituting regulation and compensation funds for traditional tort
recovery in the mass tort context, a well-designed scheme may be best
for efficient and effective compensation for victims of family
separation. Moreover, even if such legislation is not ultimately
passed, legislative consideration of such a proposal may serve as a
deterrent to the executive branch in considering similar policies in
the future.255
It lies beyond the scope of this article to explore the specifics
of a legislatively authorized alternative to traditional tort actions and
constitutional damages claims. Nonetheless, with likely over four
thousand children affected by the Trump Administration’s family
separation policy and practice, this may be a situation ripe for an
umbrella remedy. When powerful entities inflict damage on a large
number of individuals—and not all victims can be immediately
identified nor can the emergence of the full extent of their injuries be
readily determined—creating an ongoing mechanism to identify
victims and to handle their needs for compensation and medical care
may make sense.256 As with other situations where Congress has
created programs like this,257 or powerful defendants have agreed to
create and fund them,258 the backdrop to such a program for victims
255.
Designing any such program raises a number of complex issues
related to corrective justice and social policy. For an overview of the sort of
concerns that would have to be taken into account, see Adam S. Zimmerman, The
Corrective Justice State, 5 J. TORT L. 189 (2012).
256.
Given that many victims of and witnesses to family separation may
not be residing in the United States, the logistics of compensation for the harms
suffered might make this situation particularly suitable for a legislative solution.
257.
For a discussion of congressionally-enacted frameworks related to
international aviation accidents, oil spills in navigable waters, nuclear power
plant accidents, and mass vaccine injuries, see NICHOLAS M. PACE & LLOYD
DIXON, ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY FOLLOWING A CATASTROPHE: ALTERNATIVES
TO RELYING SOLELY ON TRADITIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION (2017), https://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1597.html [https://perma.cc/3QQ5-2H5Q].
258.
For a review of such measures, see Jaime Dodge, Privatizing Mass
Settlement, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 335 (2014). For criticism of one high-profile
one, see Linda Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as
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of the family separation policy will be the already rising tide of more
traditional lawsuits.
Congress can also explore specific amendments to
immigration law in order to affect future conduct by the executive
branch. For example, Congress should consider establishing a
presumption, set in law, that children remain with their parent,
absent a magistrate’s (or administrative judge’s) determination that
separation is in the best interests of the child. The government should
have the burden of proving separation and placement in government
facility is necessary for the best interests of the child. While the law
should include exceptions for children who are legitimately
unaccompanied or whose safety and well-being mandates government
custody, the law should be clear that children cannot be detained in
government custody for potentially indefinite periods, and that the
executive branch cannot separate children from accompanying adults
merely because the adults have been charged with improper entry—a
violation that often results in a penalty of time served. Immigration
law should also be amended to direct that immigration policies and
enforcement may not be intentionally punitive, consistent with
historical judicial precedent. Overall, Congress should exercise its
budget and oversight authority to influence executive branch
activities that focus on expediting immigration processing, including
asylum claims, versus expanding a bureaucracy focused on detention.
Finally, notwithstanding the United States’ non-ratification of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Congress should ensure
that U.S. policies live up to the representation that domestic laws are
already sufficient to protect children’s rights and interests.
Legislators should take steps to ensure that the executive branch acts
consistently at home with the principles it espouses abroad. Even
without ratifying international instruments, Congress can build
protections into domestic law, so that the U.S. government acts in
accordance with established international standards and consistent
with basic principles of humanity.

a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819
(2011).

